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SNAPCHAT'S GIFT:
EQUITY CULTURE IN HIGH-TECH FIRMS
AmY DEEN WESTBROOK
DAVID A. WESTBROOK**
ABSTRACT

Snap, Inc., the company that owns the platform Snapchat, controbersially offered
nonvoting common shares to the public in 2017. This Article asks what it means to invest in
Snap or other (mostly technology-based) companies in which common shareholders
collectibely have little or no power to influence corporatepolicy. In particular, why do such
investors expect to be compensated? This Article explores the familiar rationalesfor equity
investing, including stock appreciationand dividends, and the logical shortcomings of those
rationales in these circumstances. Adopting Henry Manne's "two systems" approach to
corporate affairs through both law and economics, we show that corporation law fails to
ensure that corporations return business profits to shareholders. A similar analysis of the
market for corporate control concludes that, without shareholder boting, the market for
corporate control also fails to ensure a return to shareholders.
Shareholders who invest in firms in the absence of legal or market mechanisms to secure
a return on their inbestment, howeber, are not irrational.Instead, inbestors rely on cultural
understandings of appropriate reciprocity. This Article employs Marcel Mauss's cultural
anthropology classic, The Gift, to explain the equity culture in which shareholders invest in
Snap and other high-technology firms, and in which such firms operate. This Article
concludes by suggestingsome ramificationsof understandingshareholding,and consequently
management, in terms of equity culture.
This Article also complements the substantialwork of behabioraleconomics in explaining
inbestor choice and organizationalbehabiors. The field of corporatefinance traditionallyhas
been organized around the figure of the rationally self-interested indibidual. Behabioral
economics argues that people are not as rational as orthodox corporatefinance assumes. This
Article argues that people in markets are not as individual as corporatefinance assumes.
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I. INTRODUCTION

At a potlatch,' leaders of the indigenous peoples of North America's
west coast gave each other gifts. Although in some ways "voluntary,"
the honor of the giver and the recipient depended on exchanges.
Failure to accept the gift could be spiritually dangerous' and
tantamount to a declaration of war.3 Failure to reciprocate with a gift
of equal or greater value would mean losing the competition for honor. 4
In his 1925 book The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in
Archaic Societies, Marcel Mauss identified "archaic" societies around
the world in which honor and status were established by a well-defined
and authoritative tradition of gift-giving. The impact of The Gift on
cultural anthropology and on broader streams of social thought is
difficult to overstate.6 This Article suggests that Mauss's work also
provides a way to understand recent developments in the U.S. public
1. Potlatch, a Chinook term, is defined in various ways in the Marcel Mauss's book
The Gift. As explained in the editorial note to the 1990 edition, definitions include: "[S]ystem
for the exchange of gifts, (as a verb) to feed, to consume, place of being satiated [Boas]. As
elaborated by Mauss, it consists of a festival where goods and services of all kinds are
exchanged. Gifts are made and reciprocated with interest. There is a dominant idea of rivalry
and competition between the tribe or tribes assembled for the festival, coupled occasionally
with conspicuous consumption." EditorialNote to MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND
REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES vii (W.D. Halls trans. 1990) (2002)
[hereinafter MAUSS] (internal quotation marks omitted). Potlatch should be sharply
distinguished from barter, particularly in the case of North American indigenous persons,
because of the hierarchical and spiritual significance of the exchange. See id. at 43.
2. Id. at 16.
3. Id. at 7.
4. Id. at xi.
5. See id.
6. In calling the book "monumental," Jacques Derrida noted that the book "speaks of
everything but the gift." Marshall Sahlins called the book "a gift to the ages," but goes on to
write that while it is "[a]pparently completely lucid, with no secrets even for the novice, it
remains a source of an unending ponderation." Id. at i.
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equity markets, notably the 2017 initial public offering (IPO) of Snap,
Inc. (Snap).7
For Mauss, questions of status and honor entailed the social field
in which status could be asserted and had its meaning.8 Although the
giver and the recipient of the gift had interests, such interests were
defined within the culture.9 To understand gifts at a potlach to be
"self-interested," or givers and recipients to be "individuals," in the
sense that those words are often used in contemporary legal and
economic discourse, would be a serious misreading of Mauss.
In addition, the word "archaic" must be treated with caution. Mauss
ultimately located gift exchange in Roman contract law.o Roman law
lies at the center of the self-understanding of French and other
continental legal systems-including the civil law of contract." Mauss
was suggesting something important about then-contemporary
commercial relations: markets should be understood in terms of the
social relations established by the flux of trade, as opposed to
individualistically, in terms of the self-interest of isolated actors. As
Mary Douglas points out in her foreword to the 1990 edition of the
book, a subtext and perhaps the vital intention of The Gift is an
argument against then-contemporary individualistic utilitarianism.1 2
Mauss thus used the word "archaic" to invite his readers to entertain
a critique of their social relations that many might have dismissed out
of hand if stated explicitly.
There are of course clear differences between modern equity
markets and the tribal societies that Mauss studied, but his depiction
of the potlatch system of gift exchanges has much to say about recent
offerings of stock with minimal or no voting rights, notably Snap's
startlingly successful $3.4 billion IPO of nonvoting common stock.1 3
7. For a theoretical discussion of how cultural anthropology, specifically refunctioned
ethnography, can be used to think through present situations like equity markets, see DAVID
A. WESTBROOK, NAVIGATORS OF THE CONTEMPORARY: WHY ETHNOGRAPHY MATTERS (2008).

8. Not incidentally, Marcel Mauss was Emile Durkheim's nephew. Seth Leacock, The
Ethnological Theory of Marcel Mauss, 56 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 58, 59 (1954).
9. See MAUSS, supra note 1, at xviii.
10. Id. at 60-69.
11. See ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 1-2 (1981). See also JAMES G.
APPLE

&

ROBERT P.

DEYLING,

A PRIMER

ON

THE

CIVIL-LAW

SYSTEM

1

(1995),

https://www.fic.gov/content/primer-civil-law-system-0 [https://perma.cc/9VV7-YBFS]. Apple
and Deyling note: "To understand the different civil-law systems as they exist today in
European and Latin American countries and elsewhere, one must necessarily begin in
antiquity, because the civil law, in all of its variations, has as its bedrock the written law
and legal institutions of Rome. Its very name derives from the jus civile, the civil law of
Rome." Id.
12. MAUSS, supra note 3, at xiii-xvi.
13. See Seth Fiegerman, Snapchat Raises $3.4 Billion in IPO, CNN BUSINESS (Mar. 1,
2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/03/01/technology/snap-ipo-final-pricing/
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And perhaps Snap is not the anomalous case it appears to be on first
glance; maybe Snap is a synecdoche for finance capitalism, at least as
conducted in Silicon Valley.
Investors buying Snap's nonvoting shares give money to Snap or
some other seller, and presumably expect to be given something more
valuable in return. 14 But on what is this expectation based? This
Article argues that investors' expectation is fundamentally based on
what is sometimes called "equity culture."" To purchase Snap shares
is to participate in a cultural tradition, and should be understood
traditionally, that is, according to the logic and rationales of that
culture.
On account of its admittedly nontraditional nonvoting shares, the
Snap IPO received a great deal of publicity well before it was effected.1 6
The IPO flew in the face of the widely held view that a share of common
stock provides the right to cast a single vote on various matters, most
importantly, the election of the board of directors." Investors in Snap
evidently did not care and bought the shares anyway.
Of course, different classes of shares, with different voting rights,
are an old-if sometimes controversial-idea.1 8 Henry Ford, for
[https://perma.cc/DG2U-KN6K] (quoting an analyst as saying that '[e]ven the original
naysayers and detractors from the deal have pretty much softened their negativity"); Equally
startling, Snap conducted its IPO with no headquarters. Nina Agrawal, Snap has no
headquarters, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-liveupdates-snap-ipo-snapchat-s-unusual-real-estate-strategy- 1488296152-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/WCX3-9XV8].
14. People use Snap's best-known product, Snapchat, to give one another pictures or
brief videos with short messages (called snaps) that disappear after they are viewed. Snaps
are gifts, but these are not the gifts that this Article explores.
15. This term is well known. See, e.g., B. MARK SMITH, THE EQUITY CULTURE: THE
STORY OF THE GLOBAL STOCK MARKET (2003) (discussing the development of the
international market of stocks, bonds and other instruments).
16. Dominic Rushe, Snapchat to Make High-Profile Stock Debut After Revealing IPO
Plans, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/02/snap
chat-ipo-goes-public-evan-spiegel-owner-tech [https://perma.cc/UA9N-4URU] ("The sale will
be an unusual one. The company will not be selling any voting shares, allowing the
company's founders to keep total control of Snap Inc even after raising money in the public
markets."); Chris Loterina, Here Are The Reasons Why You Should Avoid Buying The Snap
IPO, TECH TIMES (Feb. 26, 2017), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/199249/20170226/hereare-the-reasons-why-you-should-avoid-buying-the-snap-ipo.htm
[https://perma.cc/W9Y6Z73B] ("Some [analysts] have balked at the manner in which Snap's shareholders are not
entitled to any voting rights. Simply put, there will be a number of trial and errors along the
way for this new kind of organization and the shareholders will be powerless to do anything
about it.").
17. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69
WASH. U. L. Q. 565, 565 (1991).
18. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 693-706 (1985) (tracing
the background of the one share, one vote controversy); Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 568-73
(explaining limitations on shareholder voting rights between 1900 and 1987).
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example, used different classes of shares to retain control of his car
company. 9 In more recent years, founders of high-technology
companies, now seen as central to the economy (or at least the stock
market), have used classes of shares, some with more votes than
others, to retain control. 2 0 Snap may simply be a pure expression of an
established idea-that all shareholders are equal-but some
shareholders are more equal than others. 2 1
A number of shareholder groups and index funds protested Snap's
idea of issuing nonvoting shares. 2 2 Index funds in particular expressed
concern. An index fund purchases a portfolio of shares that mimics a
given index, without doing research or otherwise spending resources
deciding what or when to buy and sell. 23 Index funds therefore have
low operating costs and have come to dominate the public equity
markets. 2 4 In soliciting investment, index funds promise to investors
that they will stick to this strategy. 25 So, if nonvoting Snap shares were
a component of an index in question, for example the
Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500, funds that use the S&P 500 as an index
would be compelled to buy Snap shares that carried no vote.
The California State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTeRS)
Fund and about fifty other investors that collectively accounted for
approximately $22 trillion in assets under management, objected
strongly to Snap and other companies that do not have a one-shareper-vote capital structure. 2 6 Norway's biggest sovereign wealth fund,
19. See Seligman, supra note 20, at 700.
20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. With apologies to George Orwell. See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 118 (2009)
(1945) ("All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.").
22. See Ronald Orol, Dual-Class Voting Structures Spur Growing Revolt, STREET (Apr.
12, 2017), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14084270/1/dual-class-voting-structures-spurgrowing-revolt.html [https://perma.cc/S37M-MNZL] ("The [Council of Institutional
Investors] has been leading an institutional investor effort to discourage other companies
from following in Snap's footsteps. The group argues that non-voting shareholders are
disenfranchised at Snap and at other companies giving insiders control of the votes."); Yin
Wilczek, Investors Get Snappy Over Snap No-Vote Shares, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 24, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/investors-snappy-snap-b57982085665/ ("In the U.K., a group of fund
managers are lobbying against including Snap in indexes run by the London Stock
Exchange's FTSE Russell unit.").
23. See Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate
Governance Consequences of Passive Investing, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 804, 804 (2018).
24. See Timothy Strauts, 5 Charts on U.S. Fund Flows That Show the Shift to Passive
Investing, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.morningstar.com/blog/2018/03/12/fu
nd-flows-charts.html [https://perma.cc/UV7F-DTMT].
25. See Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 493, 506 (2018) (explaining that index funds' philosophy of automatically tracking
an index enables them to charge lower fees than active funds, and investors are attracted to
that model).
26. Andrea Vittorio, Snap-Like Firms Should Report Investing Risks, Panel Tells SEC,
83
BLOOMBERG
BNA
CORP.
COUNSEL
WEEKLY
158
(Mar.
14,
2018),
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worth an estimated $960 billion alone, backed a plan to place a "zero
investability weight" on companies with no listed voting shares. 27 On
August 1, 2017, five months after the Snap offering, S&P Dow Jones
Indices effectuated a new rule barring companies that limit
shareholders' rights (or rather that have multiple classes of shares)
from being part of its indices. 2 8 Companies already included in an S&P
index, like Facebook and Alphabet (the parent company of Google), are
exempted from the new rule, but Snap is ineligible for inclusion. 2 9
So why did investors buy into-and indices and index funds object
to-the Snap IPO? The answer to this question requires a seemingly
naive inquiry that must be treated with care: why do people invest in
stocks? What does it mean that people invested in Snap (or Facebook
or Alphabet) despite not being able to affect the fate of their
investments in any way? Although there are a variety of legal and
economic arguments that may be made regarding protections and
powers that these new shareholders have, the arguments are
unconvincing. From a perspective suggested by Mauss, however, both
the investor behavior and the management's treatment of its new
"owners" make considerable sense.
Gifts, and by implication exchanges more broadly, both create and
must be understood in terms of webs of cultural context. As sketched
above, Mauss argued that gifts were constitutive of archaic society;
from there, it is a short leap to the proposition that exchanges
constitute commercial societies. The Snap IPO demonstrates this
https://biglawbusiness.com/snap-like-firms-should-report-investing-risks-panel-tells-sec/?
promocode=LIPP101AA%3Fpromocode [https://perma.cc/CX2W-DVZZ].
27. Jonas Bergman, Norway Wealth Fund Wants to Exclude Voteless Shares from
Indexes, BLOOMBERG BNA CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (June 26, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-26/norway-wealth-fund-wants-toexclude-voteless-shares-from-indexes [https://perma.cc/B4V3-WJ65].
28. Paresh Dave & Ethan Varian, S&P 500 Will Exclude Snap Because its Stock Gives
New
Shareholders
No
Power,
L.A.
TIMES
(Aug.
1,
2017),
http://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-snap-sp-2017080 1-story.html
[https://perma.cc/U6JT-WVNR ] (reporting that the S&P rule would impact a handful of
companies but was designed to punish Snap and any firms that follow in its footsteps).
"Tracking stocks and companies with multiple share class structures are not eligible for the
S&P Composite 1500 and its component indices." S&P Dow JONES INDICES, S&P U.S.
INDICES: METHODOLOGY 6 (2019), https://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/metho
dology-sp-us-indices.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZZZ-RQ3R].
29. Chris Dieterich, Snap Barredfrom S&P 500 Under New Rules, MONEYBEAT WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2017/08/01/snap-barred-from-sp-500under-new-rules/ [https://perma.cc/C9TM-R4ZA] (discussing S&P Dow Jones Indices'
announcement that companies with multiple class shares are not eligible to join the index).
That same day, Snap's share price hit a then-record low. Katie Roof, Snap Hits Record Low
after Getting Rejected from the S&P 500, TECHCRUNCH (Aug.
1, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/01/snap-hits-record-low-after-getting-rejected-from-the-sp500/ [https://perma.cc/F9QD-PJFL] (noting that Snap shares fell 4 percent and closed at
$13.10 after the S&P announcement).
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proposition because the transaction is virtually impossible to
understand in terms of rational individualism; and therefore, if Snap's
investors are rational at all, they must be socially rational.
Mauss's insights can be used to complement the substantial work
of behavioral economics in explaining investor choice and
organizational behaviors.3 0 The field of corporate finance traditionally
has been organized around the figure of the rationally self-interested
individual.3 1 Behavioral economics argues that people are not all that
rational.3 2 This Article argues that people in markets are not all that
individual.
Part II will look more closely at the Snap offering, in addition to
other relatively recent offerings of nonvoting, or at least powerless
shares, in (mostly technology-based) companies. Part III will explore
the familiar rationales for equity investing, including stock
appreciation and dividends, and the logical shortcomings of those
rationales. Part IV, by adopting Henry Manne's "two systems" of
corporate affairs: law and economics,33 will show that corporation law
fails to ensure that corporations return business profits to
shareholders. Part V will conduct a similar analysis of the market for
corporate control, concluding that without shareholder voting rights,
the market for corporate control also fails to ensure a return for
shareholders. Part VI will then employ Mauss's understanding of gift
societies to explore the equity culture in which shareholders invest in
Snap and other high-technology firms, and in which such firms
operate. Part VII will conclude by suggesting some ramifications of
understanding shareholding, and consequently management, in terms
of this equity culture.

30. For an excellent summary of behavioral economics and the forces at work in
mergers and acquisitions, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of
Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 65 (2011) (exploring theories
of behavior and motivation, including CEO ego, that depart considerably from strict rational
choice assumptions in traditional economic models).
31. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMICS 23 (2002)
(mentioning the rational actor theory which is based on individuals making rationally selfinterested choices).
32. See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How BehavioralEconomics Trims Its Sails and
Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1593, 1601 (2014) (describing the ways that social scientists
focus on ways that human behavior differs from the rational behavior assumed by
neoclassical economics).
33. Henry G. Manne, Our Two CorporationSystems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L.
REV. 259 (1967).
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II. SNAP AND ITS KIN

On March 2, 2017, Snap offered 200 million Class A shares for $17
each in an oversubscribed3 4 IPO of common stock.3 5 The Class A shares
are nonvoting-although shareholders are entitled to attend the
company's annual meeting and to ask questions.3 6 In addition to the
Class A common stock, Snap also has Class B one-vote-per-share stock,
which is reserved for company insiders and early investors, and Class
C ten-votes-per-share stock, which is held exclusively by the company's
co-founders, Bobby Murphy and Evan Spiegel.37 Murphy and Spiegel
cashed out more than $250 million each in the IPO, but still control
nearly ninety percent of the voting power of the company.3 8 The Class
A nonvoting shares closed on March 2, 2017 up forty-four percent at
$24.4839 and up over fifty-nine percent at $27.09 on March 3, 2017.40
Although the Snap IPO is notable for the fact that the publicly
traded common shares carried no vote at all, this was hardly the first
time investors have eagerly purchased IPO common shares with no
hope of influencing company policy.41 Dual-class share structures were

34.

Some estimates put the oversubscription at 10 times. Lauren Hirsch, Snap Shares
on First Day on NYSE,
BNA BLOOMBERG,
(Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/snap-shares-open-at-us-24-after-us- 17-ipo-pricing1.685376/snap-s-sought-after-shares-set-for-market-debut-after-3-4-billion-ipo- 1.685376
[https://perma.cc/XDP2-MEVE].
35. Snap Inc., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) at 8 (Feb. 24, 2017).
36. Snap Inc., Prospectus filed pursuant to Rule 424(b)(4) at 5, 184 (Mar. 1, 2017).

Gain

44%

37. Kurt Wagner, One Way Snapchat's IPO Will Be Unique: The Shares Won't Come
with Voting Rights, RECODE.NET, (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.recode.net/2017/2/21/146703
14/snap-ipo-stock-voting-structure [https://perma.cc/6SCM-4ZKG].

38. Caitlin Huston, Snapchat Founders, Investors Cash Out Nearly $1 Billion in Snap
IPO, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/snapchatfounders-and-investors-sell-millions-of-shares-in-snap-ipo-20 17-03-01
[https://perma.cc/5UCB-H5BU].
39. Anita Balakrishnan, Snap Closes up 44% after Rollicking IPO, CNBC (Mar. 2,
2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/02/snapchat-snap-open-trading-price-stock-ipo-firstday.html [https://perma.cc/6V6X-44NK].

40. Snap Inc. Class A Common Stock (SNAP) Historical Prices & Data,

NASDAQ,

https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/snap/historical (last visited June 3, 2018).

41. See Maureen Farrell, Tech Founders Want IPO Riches Without Those Pesky
Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/control-geeks-techfounders-want-ipo-investors-not-their-input- 1491236464
[https://perma.cc/LBA5-9TVF];

Lisa Lambert & Ross Kerber, After Snap IPO, U.S. Regulator Questions Unequal Voting
Rights, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sec-rightsidUSKBN16G2LO [https://perma.cc/EA2N-KCPT]; Hannah Roberts, SnapchatIsn't Offering

Voting Rights in its IPO - and PotentialInvestors Are Furious, BUS.

INSIDER

(Feb. 3, 2017),

http://www.businessinsider.com/snapchat-ipo-no-voting-rights-investor-letter-2017-2
[https://perma.cc/6LQL-BRGW]; Madison Marriage, State Street Asks SEC to Block Nonvoting
Shares, FIN.
TIMES
(June
17,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/
9595e5c4-51db-11e7-bfb8-997009366969 [https://perma.cc/5FV6-66YW].
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first introduced in the early twentieth century. 42 In 1925, Dodge
Brothers, Inc. 43 and Industrial Rayon Corporation issued nonvoting
stock. 44 This created considerable controversy at the time, with both
politicians and academics criticizing the disenfranchisement of the
public investor. 45 In 1940, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) took
action, banning the listing of nonvoting securities. 4 6
Dual-class structures with heavily weighted voting stock for
insiders 47 became popular again in the 1980s as a takeover defense. 4 8
In 1984, the NYSE relaxed its prohibition 4 9 as it confronted
competition from the NASDAQ listing service, which imposed no
voting requirements, and the American Stock Exchange, which
permitted listing of dual-class stock. 0 Negative investor and
regulatory opinions of dual-class capital structures persisted,"
however, and in 1988, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
adopted Rule 19c-4, which effectively prevented the listing of securities
of companies that issued securities or took other actions to nullify,
restrict, or reduce the voting rights of existing shareholders.5 2 The
Business Roundtable promptly challenged Rule 19c-4 and two years
later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated the rule
42. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 568.
43. Id. at 569 (explaining that Dodge Brothers, Inc., which was completely controlled
by an investment banking firm, listed bonds, preferred stock, and nonvoting common shares
on the NYSE in 1925).
44. Seligman, supra note 18, at 693-94 (relying on Adolf Berle).
45. See WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927). A Harvard
economics professor, William Ripley denounced the nonvoting stock as the "crowning
infamy" of corporate actions at the time. Id. at 86-7 (1927). As Professor Stephen Bainbridge
explained, Ripley's argument was an "early version of the conflict of interest argument:
promoters used nonvoting common stock as a way of maintaining voting control for
themselves. By issuing the voting common stock to insiders and nonvoting common stock to
the public, promoters raised considerable sums without losing control of the enterprise."
Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 569.
46. Seligman, supra note 18, at 699. In what is commonly considered to be a politically
motivated decision, the NYSE made an exception to its policy in 1956 and allowed Ford
Motor Company to list despite the fact that the Ford family controlled 40% of the voting
power with only 5% of the equity Id. at 700.
47. In a typical dual-class stock company, insiders hold common stock with multiple
votes while the public holds one-vote-one-share stock. Id. at 687.
48. Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 570-71.
49. Seligman, supra note 18, at 700.
50. Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 576-77.
51. Id. at 574-583 (chronicling the SEC's concerns with dual-class structures when they
adopted Rule 19c-4).
52. 17 C.F.R. Sec. 240.19c-4 (1990). Rule 19c-4, "Voting Rights Listing Standards;
Disenfranchisement Rule," prohibited the exchanges, who were subject to SEC authority,
from listing or continuing to list the equity securities of an issuer that took one of the
prohibited actions. See Exch. Act Rel. No. 25891 (Jul. 7, 1988), 53 F.R. 26376 (Jul. 12, 1988),
http://cdn.loc.gov/service/11/fedreg/fr053/fr053133/fr053 133.pdf.
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as exceeding the SEC's authority.53 The NYSE and the NASD (the
regulator of the NASDAQ system at the time) adopted listing
standards "essentially identical" to Rule 19c-4,5 4 but those were
subsequently loosened." Currently, U.S. exchanges permit IPOs by
companies with existing dual-class structures, but prohibit already
listed companies from restructuring into a dual-class system. 6 The
exchanges continue to face investor pressure to further limit such
structures.57

53. The Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (vacating Rule 19c4 because it interfered with the allocation of powers among shareholders).
54. Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 625.
55. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, Voting Rights, § 313.000(A) & (B),
http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCMTools/bookmark.asp?id=sx-ruling-nysepolicymanual_313.00&manual=/lcm/sections/lcm-sections/
[https://perma.cc/APE3-T5RG]
(explaining that the NYSE's Rule 19c-4-based rules were loosened in 1994 to enable the
exchange to adopt a flexible approach). The NASDAQ also has requirements pertaining to
voting rights, which were adopted on March 12, 2009. See NASDAQ Corporate
Governance Requirement 5640, IM-5640, http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/
PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5Fl%5Fl%5F4%5F3%5F8%5F29&manual=%2Fna
sdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequityrules%2F [https://perma.cc/MD9D-UDL7].
56. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL supra note 57, at § 313.00.10 (" [t]he restriction
against the issuance of super voting stock is primarily intended to apply to the issuance of a
new class of stock, and companies with existing dual-class capital structures would generally
be permitted to issue additional shares of the existing super voting stock without conflict
with this Policy"). Commentators on listings accuse Congress, the SEC, and the NYSE for
being asleep at the switch for allowing Snap's IPO. Ken Bertsch, Executive Director of the
Council of Institutional Investors (CII), which represents pension funds, endowments and
other large investors, noted that "he is worried that the [Snap] IPO will infect other markets
beyond the NYSE and NASDAQ, which he says next to the Netherlands, have the lowest
standards in the world." See Eleanor Bloxham, Snap Shouldn't Have Been Allowed to Go
Public Without Voting Rights, FORTUNE (Mar. 3, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/03/snapipo-non-voting-stock/ [https://perma.cc/734A-KGHQ]; Eleanor Bloxham, Jamie Dimon,
Alibaba, and Our Crumbling Regulatory Standards, FORTUNE (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://fortune.com/2013/10/07/j amie-dimon-alibaba-and-our-crumbling-regulatorystandards/ [https://perma.cc/3AER-KUZQ].
57. On October 24, 2018, CII petitioned the NASDAQ and the NYSE to require issuers
with dual-class share structures to phase out the arrangements within seven years of their
IPOs. Tom Zanki, Investors Urge Exchanges to Phase Out Dual-Class Voting, LAW360 (Oct.
24, 2018), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/1095315/investors-urge-exchanges-to-phase-outdual-class-voting [https://perma.cc/P47X-NVUQ]. CII noted that a number of influential
asset managers, including Black Rock, T. Rowe Price, CalSTeRS, and the California Public
Employees' Retirement System, supported its petition for sunsets. Id. According to CII, a
third of companies with dual-class share structures that give insiders extra voting power
now have sunset provisions for that structure. See Andrea Vittorio, More Supervoting Stocks
Get Expiration Dates as Investors Balk, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XA8HA7JGOOOOOO?bnatnews-filter=corporatelaw&jesearch=BNA%252000000166b l2ed8dca7f7b96f5a590002#jcite [https://perma.cc/GD
A2-3D27]. SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson has also called for sunsets on dual-class
structures. Commissioner Robert J. Jackson Jr., "Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case
Against Corporate Royalty," inaugural speech given at University of California, Berkeley,
San Francisco, CA, (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-classstock-case-against-corporate-royalty
[https://perma.cc/6PZZ-25C5]
(stating that "our
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Although the decline of the 1980s takeover fever shifted the
spotlight for a few decades, 8 dual-class share structures 9 have again
become popular-now as a method for the founders of technology startup companies to retain control while accessing public company capital
61
markets.6 0 Google's 2004 IPO with a dual-class capital structure

country's founding principles and our corporate law counsel against the creation of corporate
royalty" with perpetual dual-class structures).
58. Notably, however, The New York Times has always used a dual-class share
structure which secures control of the media enterprise by the Sulzberger family. Joe Nocera,
How
Punch
Protected
the
Times,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
1,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/opinion/nocera-how-punch-protected-the-times.html
[https://perma.cc/VV54-M49A].
59. A compromise between single-class and dual-class structures is the use of timephased voting. This structure is beyond the scope of this article but has been
comprehensively analyzed by Professors Dallas and Barry. See generally Lynne L.
Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 541 (2016) (arguing that time-phased voting arrangements facilitate controlling
insider diversification, and that corporations employing the structure outperform the
market).
60. The accountability of management insiders in dual-class companies is further
compromised by the fact that many such firms qualify as "controlled companies," defined as
listed companies "of which more than 50% of the voting power for the election of directors is
held by an individual, a group or another company." NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra
note 57, at § 303A.00. Controlled companies are exempted from NYSE governance rules
requiring companies to have a majority of independent directors on the board, and to ensure
that nominating, corporate governance, and compensation committees are composed entirely
of independent directors. Id. at §§ 303A.01, 303A04 & 303A.05.
61. Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at iii (Apr. 29, 2004) [hereinafter
Google Form S-1], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/
dsl.htm [https://perma.cc/4C5J-4HCL]. In the Registration Statement, Google's founder
Larry Page argued:
We are creating a corporate structure that is designed for stability over long
time horizons. By investing in Google, you are placing an unusual long-term bet
on the team, especially Sergey and me, and on our innovative approach....
In the transition to public ownership, we have set up a corporate structure
that will make it harder for outside parties to take over or influence Google. This
structure will also make it easier for our management team to follow the long
term, innovative approach emphasized earlier. This structure, called a dual class
voting structure, is described elsewhere in this prospectus.
The main effect of this structure is likely to leave our team, especially Sergey
and me, with significant control over the company's decisions and fate, as Google
shares change hands. New investors will fully share in Google's long term growth
but will have less influence over its strategic decisions than they would at most
public companies....
Google has prospered as a private company. As a public company, we believe
a dual class voting structure will enable us to retain many of the positive aspects
of being private. We understand some investors do not favor dual class
structures. We have considered this point of view carefully, and we have not
made our decision lightly. We are convinced that everyone associated with
Google-including new investors-will benefit from this structure.
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marked the beginning of a trend that seems to have reached its purest
expression with the Snap offering. Google (ticker symbol GOOGL)
listed Class A one-vote-per-share common stock on the NASDAQ in
2004.62 The company founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, retained
nonpublic super-voting 63 Class B ten-votes-per-share common stock. 64
Although the Financial Crisis soured the IPO market for several
years, by 2011, the pace of technology IPOs with dual-class structures
began to pick up. 6 On May 19, 2011, Linkedln (LNKD) went public 66
with one-vote-per-share Class A shares. 67 The existing shareholders,
including co-founder Reid Hoffman and three venture capital
Id.

In 2015, Google Inc. was reorganized, with the listed company now known as Alphabet,
Inc. See Jillian D'Onfro, Google Is Now Alphabet, Bus. INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/google-officially-becomes-alphabet-today-2015-10
[https://perma.cc/2NY2-7F4G].
62. Google Form S-1, supra note 63, at 20.
63. "Super-voting" shares typically confer more than one vote per share, enabling their
holders to outvote the holders of listed common stock. The extra votes can give company
founders more power to elect directors and take other actions which require a shareholder
vote. The extra votes can also protect the founders from the majority of the company's
shareholders
and
their
potentially
differing
opinions/priorities.
See
Rolfe
Winkler & Maureen Farrell, In FounderFriendly Era, Star Tech EntrepreneursGrabPower,
Huge Pay, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-founder-friendly-erastar-tech-entrepreneurs-grab-power-huge-pay- 1527539114?mod=searchresults&page= 1
&pos=2 [https://perma.cc/B649-N5JY].
64. Google Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 9 to Form S-1/A) at 30 (Aug.
18, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504142742/
dsla.htm [https://perma.cc/SGE6-LRS7]. Google's founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin
explained:
The main effect of this structure is likely to leave our team, especially Sergey
and me, with increasingly significant control over the company's decisions and
fate, as Google shares change hands. After the IPO, Sergey, Eric and I will
control 37.6% of the voting power of Google, and the executive management team
and directors as a group will control 61.4% of the voting power. New investors
will fully share in Google's long term economic future but will have little ability
to influence its strategic decisions through their voting rights."
Id. at 30.
65. Between the 2004 Google IPO and 2011, the media company Scripps Networks
Interactive (SNI) offered Class A common shares on June 20, 2008. The SNI shares were
limited to electing one third of the board. At the time, SNI was controlled by the Edward W.
Scripps Trust, which ended in 2012 with the death of the last descendent of the founder on
whom the duration of the trust was based. A complex family agreement, however, ensures
that the next generation will continue to control SNI. See Mark Kroeger, The Edward W.
Scripps Trust Ends, SCRIPPS NETWORKS INTERACTIVE, INC. (Oct. 19, 2012),
http://ir.scrippsnetworks.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=222475&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1747643
[https://perma.cc/EV97-V3MR].
66. See Julianne Pepitone, Linkedln Stock More Than Doubles in IPO, CNN MONEY
(May 19, 2011), https://money.cnn.com/2011/05/19/technology/linkedinIPO/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/69YC-9NG2] (noting that the shares, priced at $45, closed at $94.25 a share
at the end of their first day of trading on the NYSE).
67. Linkedln Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 42 (Nov. 3, 2011) (noting the dual
class structure as a risk factor).

2019]

SNAPCHAT'S GIFT

873

shareholders, retained super-voting Class B (ten-vote s-per- share)
shares. 68 As a result, the public shareholders were able to purchase
less than one percent of the company voting power.6 9 On November 4,
2011, Groupon (GRPN) followed suit, offering one-vote-per-share Class
A common stock;7 0 the founders retaining all of the Class B 150-votesper-share, as well as some of the Class A shares.7 Zynga Inc. (ZNGA)
founder Mark Pincus held a class of shares with seventy-votes-pershare when the videogame company went public on December 16,
2011,72 ensuring him majority voting power, despite the offer of Class
A (one-vote-per-share) stock to the public.7 3
In April 2014, Google went back to the public markets and issued a
third Class C common stock (listed separately as GOOG) for employee
stock incentive plans, acquisitions, and other stock sales. 7 4 The Class
C shares provide a right to dividends but not to vote.7 The 2015
68. Linkedln Corp., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 5 to Form S-1/A) at 26
(May 17, 2011).
69. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Plansfor LinkedIn's I.P.O. May Make Few Friends, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (May 10, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/plans-forlinkedins-i-p-o-may-make-few-friends/?mtrref=undefined [https://perma.cc/V9Y8-N75X].
70. Groupon, Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 7 to Form S-1/A) at 134
(Nov. 1, 2011).
71. Nell Minow, The Hidden Danger of IPOs Like Groupon and Linkedln - and What It
Will Cost, MONEY WATCH CBS NEWS (June 11, 2011), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/thehidden-danger-of-ipos-like-groupon-and-linkedin-and-what-it-will-cost/
[https://perma.cc/E2K3-5CDA]. Note, however, that Groupon Inc.'s dual-class stock
structure converted to a single common class as scheduled on October 31, 2016, five years
after the IPO. See Amina Elahi, Groupon Went Public 5 Years Ago. Will a Buyer Come in the
Next 5? CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ctgroupon-five-years-ipo-bsi-20161104-story.html [https://perma.cc/YY9P-ACM7] (noting that
Groupon's sunset date had passed as scheduled).
72. Zynga Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 8 to Form S-1/A) at 28 (Dec.
9, 2011)
73. Maureen Farrell, Tech Founders Want IPO Riches Without Those Pesky
Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/control-geeks-techfounders-want-ipo-investors-not-their-input- 1491236464 [https://perma.cc/AE89-238F].
74. Ben Pimentel, Google splits into GOOG and GOOGL, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2014/04/02/google-investors-are-about-to-get-googand-googl-shares-in-stock-split/.
75. Steven Davidoff Solomon, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-shareclass-gives-google-founders-tighter-control/ [https://perma.cc/B2CC-HZQT]. Unsurprisingly,
the Google board of directors-controlled by the founders thanks to their Class B sharesapproved the issuance of the Class C shares unanimously. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Stock Split
for Google that Cements Control at the Top, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 16, 2012),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/stock-split-for-google-that-cements-control-at-thetop/ [https://perma.cc/XS6Y-5M2Y]. As explained by one press report,
The whole effort is a transparent attempt by [Sergey] Brin and [Larry] Page to
maintain their voting control over the company without having stock issued to
employees slowly dilute their equity. The two men state as much in their
"Founders' Letter" as they describe why these new non-voting class C shares are
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placement of Google under the umbrella of a new holding company,
Alphabet, Inc. (controlled by Page and Brin), retained the Google share
structure .76
The Facebook (FB) offering took place on May 18, 2012.77 Founder
Mark Zuckerberg and other early investors held ten-votes-per-share
stock,7 8 and offered one-vote-per-share Class A common stock to the
public.7 9 The structure ensured Zuckerberg's voting control over the
company. In the face of a shareholder lawsuit, the company abandoned
a subsequent plan to issue nonvoting Class C shares of stock.8 0
On September 19, 2014, Chinese internet retailer Alibaba (BABA)
accomplished its U.S. IPO,81 reportedly made in the United States

being issued as part of a stock split: "These non-voting shares will be available
for corporate uses, like equity-based employee compensation, that might
otherwise dilute our governance structure."
Barry Randall, Why Google Just Issued A New Stock Class, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 17, 2012),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-google-just-issued-a-new-stock-class-2012-04-17
[https://perma.cc/WGU8-Q8HS]. As of April 19, 2019, there were 349,291,000 Class C Shares
outstanding. ALPHABET INC. STOCK REPORT, https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/goog/stockreport (providing the current number of shares outstanding, which may change daily).
76. Trevir Nath, What Google's Alphabet Means for Investors and Wall Street,
NASDAQ.COM (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/what-googles-alphabetmeans-for-investors-and-wall-street-cm50872 1.
77. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook Trading Sets Record IPO Volume, CNN MONEY (May
18,
2012), https://money.cnn.com/2012/05/18/technology/facebook-ipo-trading/index.htm
(noting " [m]ore than 80 million shares changed hands in the first 30 seconds of trading").
78. Jeremy Quittner, To Maintain Control of Your Company After Its IPO, Follow Mark
Zuckerberg's Lead, INC.COM (June 11, 2015), https://www.inc.com/jeremy-quittner/facebookvotes-down-one-share-one-vote-proxy-move.html [https://perma.cc/YBX4-YF6L].
79. Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 8 (Feb. 1, 2012).
80. See Tom Hals, Zuckerberg Nixes New Facebook Share Class After Shareholder
Lawsuit, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-stocktrial/zuckerberg-nixes-new-facebook-share-class-after-shareholder-lawsuitidUSKCN1BX2PA [https://perma.cc/KN6M-6ZPN]. Zuckerberg planned to create a new
class of company stock with no voting power as a way for him to retain control over the
company while fulfilling a pledge to give away his wealth. Hals notes that Zuckerberg
abandoned his plans just before:
[he] was scheduled to testify on [September 19, 2017] in Wilmington, Delaware,
in a shareholder lawsuit seeking to halt the Class C stock plan, which had been
approved by shareholders. Sjunde AP-Fonden, a Swedish national pension fund,
and The Amalgamated Bank sued [in 2016], saying that Zuckerberg should have
to pay for the right to retain control while selling stock.
Id. Facebook later settled an action over the shareholder plaintiffs' attorneys' fees for $67.5
million. See Jef Feeley & Sarah Frier, Facebook to Pay $67.5 Million in Fees in Suit over
Shares,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
24,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018- 10-24/facebook-to-pay-67-5-million-in-fees-in-non-voting-shares-suit
[https://perma.cc/JX7T-CPJY].
81. See Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (May 6, 2014);
Matt Egan, Boom: Alibaba Surges 38% in Huge IPODebut, CNN BUSINESS (Sept. 19, 2014),
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after the Hong Kong Stock Exchange refused to list shares in
companies with dual-class capital structures. 82 The offering raised a
record twenty-five billion dollars, 83 despite the fact that control of the
company is "locked forever in the hands of a group of insiders known
as the Alibaba Partnership." 8 4 Although it holds only a small minority
of the equity capital, the partnership has the exclusive right to choose
a majority of the board of directors, even if the shareholders do not
approve the partnership's candidate S.8
Dual-class shareholding is also often found in technology and
internet retail firms.8 6 For example, Wayfair, Inc. (W) offered eleven
https://money.cnn.com/2014/09/19/investing/alibaba-ipo-debut-nyse/index.html
[https://perma.cc/EH97-RV9B] (establishing the date of the IPO).
82. Paul Davies & Arash Massoudi, Alibaba Abandons $60bn Hong Kong Listing, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/525f4bc2-25ae-11e3-aee8-00144feab7de
[https://perma.cc/T378-68KW] (noting that founder Jack Ma and other top executives had
failed to persuade Hong Kong authorities that they should be allowed to nominate a majority
of the board of directors). Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd., however, subsequently
changed its rules to allow such offerings. See Christopher W. Betts et al., Hong Kong
Publishes Groundbreaking New Rules for Dual-Class Shares, Emerging and Innovative
Sectors,
SKADDEN
(Apr.
25,
2018),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/
publications/2018/04/quarterly-insights/hong-kong-publishes-groundbreaking-new-rules
[https://perma.cc/32K6-RP9G] (explaining that the new rules "permit listings of high-growth
and innovative companies with dual-class shares or 'weighted voting rights' (WVR)
structures"). The Singapore stock exchange now also allows corporate arrangements such as
dual-class shares. See Andrea Tan & Benjamin Robertson, MSCIReopens Dual-ClassShare
Debate, Starting New Consultation, BLOOMBERG BNA CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY REP.
(Feb. 2, 2018),
available at Bloomberg Law,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
product/blaw/document/P3G8J56TTDS 1?bc=W1siU2VhcmNoIFJlc3VsdHMiLCIvcHJvZHVj
dC9ibGF3L3N1YXJjaC9yZXNlbHRz [https://perma.cc/NAW2-ESB4].
83. Liyan Chen et al., Alibaba Claims Title For Largest Global IPO Ever With Extra
Share Sales, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/09/22
/alibaba-claims-title-for-largest-global-ipo-ever-with-extra-share-sales/ (explaining that the
IPO underwriters had exercised their option to purchase additional shares, raising the total
raised from $21.8 billion to $25 billion). Leena Rao, Alibaba's Shares Slide Below IPO Price,
FORTUNE
(Aug.
24,
2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/08/24/alibaba-slides-below-ipo/
[https://perma.cc/A4KY-HRS6]. Snap surpassed the record as the largest tech offering in
2017. Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Manchester United's I.P.O., A Preference for American
Rules, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jul. 10, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/inmanchester-uniteds-i-p-o-a-preference-for-u-s-rules/?mtrref=www. google.com&gwh=
EA8BD1EEAC84CB827DAB9C24BA275DB3&gwt=pay [https://perma.cc/23QX-3N9Y].
84. Lucian Bebchuk, Alibaba's Governance Leaves Investors at a Disadvantage, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 16, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/alibabasgovernance-leaves-investors-at-a-disadvantage/ [https://perma.cc/A5SM-SPXJ].
85. Id.
86. There have been a number of dual-class offerings in the non-tech sector too. For
example, Carlyle Group (May 3, 2012), The Carlyle Group L.P., Registration Statement,
(Form S-1) (Sept. 6, 2011); New Corp. (Jul. 1, 2013) New Newscorp LLC, Securities
Registration Statement (Form 10-12B) (Dec. 20, 2012); American Homes 4 Rent (Aug. 1,
2013), American Homes 4 Rent, Registration Statement (Form S-11) (June 4, 2013);
Castlight Health (Mar. 14, 2014), Castlight Health, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1)
(Feb. 10, 2014); and Shake Shack (Jan. 30, 2015), Shake Shack Inc., Registration Statement,
(Form S-1) (Dec. 29, 2014).
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million one-vote-per-share Class A shares to the public on October 2,
2015,87 but founders Niraj Shah and Steven Conine maintained
majority ownership and over seventy-one million non-public supervoting (ten-votes-per-share) Class B shares. 8 8 Fitflit (FIT) offered
Class A shares to the public on June 16, 201589 while retaining tenvotes-per-share Class B shares, and control, for its insiders.90
As the debate surrounding dual-class structures continued,9 ' Match
Group Inc. (MTCH), which owns and operates the dating app Tinder,
entered the fray with its November 19, 2015 IPO. 92 IAC/INTERActive
Corp., Match Group's parent company, offered one -vote-per-share
common stock while retaining all of the shares of the outstanding
Class B (ten-votes-per-share) stock, which represented over eighty-six
percent of the outstanding capital stock and over ninety-eight percent
of the combined voting power. 93 Even more interestingly, Match Group
87. Wayfair, Inc., Amended Registration Statement, (Form S-i/A) at 9 (Sept. 19, 2014).
88. Silvia Ascarelli & Andria Cheng, 5 Things to Know about the Wayfair IPO,
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/5-things-to-know-aboutthe-wayfair-ipo-2014-10-02 [https://perma.cc/EN7C-KYFX].
89. FitBit, Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 4 to Form S-1/A) at 9 (June
16, 2015).
90. Michael J. de la Merced, Fitbit Files to Go Public, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 7,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/08/business/dealbook/fitbit-files-to-go-public.html
[https://perma.cc/EM4Y-X5DF].
91. "There's a long-running debate on dual-class. On one hand, you have visionary
founders who want to retain control while gaining access to our public markets. On the other,
you have a structure that undermines accountability: management can outvote ordinary
investors on virtually anything." Commissioner Robert J. Jackson Jr., Perpetual Dual-Class
Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty, Inaugural Speech Given at University of
California, Berkeley, (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class[https://perma.cc/2QBF-UGML]. Mak Yuen Teen
stock-case-against-corporate-royalty
writes:
Among technology companies in the US, Facebook, Google, Groupon and
Linkedln are examples that have dual class shares. However, many others do
not have them, including Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Netflix and Twitter. Some
have argued that dual class shares encourage innovation.... Others have argued
that hostile takeovers encourage short-term thinking or threaten founder control
and therefore founders and management need to be shielded from them through
dual class shares.
Mak Yuen Teen, Say 'No" to Dual Class Shares, Bus. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2015),
http://governanceforstakeholders.com/2015/11/28/say-no-to-dual-class-shares/
[https://perma.cc/J6BG-WHPY].
92. Matt Egan, Match's Awkward FirstDate with Wall Street, CNN BUSINESS (Nov. 19,
2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/11/19/investing/match-tinder-ipo/index.html
[https://perma.cc/BRX2-NUFH] (noting that the shares ended up 23% on their first day of
trading on the Nasdaq).
93. Match Group Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at ii (Nov. 9, 2015)
[hereinafter Match Group Inc., Form S-1]. Match Group owns and operates Tinder. "Prior to
its spin-off in 2015, Match Group was a wholly-owned subsidiary of IAC (IAC), the media
conglomerate run by billionaire mogul Barry Diller. IAC still owns an economic interest of
more than 80 percent and a controlling stake of close to 98 percent. . . ." Mike Berner, Don't
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noted in its Prospectus that following the offering, they would have
three classes of authorized common stock: the common stock being
offered to the public, the Class B common stock, and the Class C
common stock.9 4 Apparently not wholly confident in the permissibility
of nonvoting Class C common stock, the company explained:
Holders of Class C common stock are not entitled to any votes per
share except as (and then only to the extent) otherwise required by
the laws of the State of Delaware, in which case holders of Class C
common stock will be entitled to one one-hundredth (1/100) of a vote
on such matters for each share of Class C common stock held. 9
The company disclosed, however, that there would be no
outstanding shares of Class C common stock upon completion of the
offering,96 and as of the end of the company's third quarter in 2018,
there were still none.97 On October 14, 2015, Square, Inc. held its
IPO,98 with new investors receiving only a tenth of the voting rights of

existing insider shareholders."
And then came the Snap offering. If investors were willing to buy
common stock with no realistic hope of affecting corporate governance
through voting, then what about common stock with no votes at all?
Evidently, a large number of investors were willing to buy such stock.
As noted above, some (often large) investors and index funds were
not happy about nonvoting shares. On July 26, 2017, index compiler
FTSE Russell announced that beginning in the fall of 2017, it would
begin barring stocks that do not give shareholders at least five percent
of voting power; for example, from its Russell 3000 index.100 On August
Commit to Match Group (At Least Not Yet), SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4 116894-commit-match-group-least-yet
[https://perma.cc/93AB-VUHX]; Elizabeth Gurdus, Cramer Unpacks IAC's Confusing
Business to Track the Value Monster's Success, CNBC (updated June 8, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/08/cramer-unpacks-iacs-confusing-business-to-track-itsvalue-creation.html [https://perma.cc/6N5U-KAU8].
94. Match Group, Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 4 to Form S-1/A) (Nov.
17, 2015).
95. Match Group Inc., Form S-1 at ii.
96. Id.
97. See Match Group, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 9, 2018).
98. Square, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Oct. 14, 2015).
99. Evan Niu, Square IPO: 4 Things You Need to Know, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Oct. 17,
2015), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/10/17/square-ipo-4-things-you-need-toknow.aspx [https://perma.cc/D756-PY2G].
100. See FTSE Russell Voting Rights Consultation - Next Steps, FTSE RUSSELL (Jul.
2017),
https://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSERussellVotingRights
ConsultationNextSteps.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT8W-668S] [hereinafter FTSE Russell
Voting Rights](summarizing the results of the voting rights consultation and proposing to
implement changes beginning in September 2017). See also Abe M. Friedman et al., S&P

and FTSE Russell on Exclusion of Companies with Multi-Class Shares, HARv. L. ScH. F. ON
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1, 2017, S&P Dow Jones Indices amended its rules to prohibit inclusion
of securities of companies whose shares offer limited or no voting
rights.10 1 The S&P Dow Jones Indices rule change effectively barred
Snap from inclusion in the S&P 500, but left both Google/Alphabet Inc.
and Facebook in the index under a grandfather clause. 1 0 2 On October
30, 2018, the controversy continued as indexer MSCI Inc. announced
that it had abandoned plans to reflect voting power in its benchmarks,
clearing the way for Snap and other companies with dual-class share
structures to be included in the MSCI indexes.1 03
Despite the controversies over the Snap offering and the S&P Dow
Jones rule change, the pace of dual-class listings has not slowed. On
September 28, 2017, Roku, Inc. (ROKU) went public with a dual-class
(public Class A at one-vote-per-share and non-public Class B at tenvotes-per-share) structure. 10 4 Ninety-eight percent of the voting power
of the company remained in the hands of insiders, including its
founder Anthony Wood.105 Data center operator Switch (SWCH) went
GOVERNANCE
&
FIN.
REG.
(Aug.
5,
2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/05/sp-and-ftse-russell-on-exclusion-of-companieswith-multi-class-shares/ [https://perma.cc/VQ4T-2WKM]; Andrea Vittorio, FTSE Russell to
Revisit Voting Power One Year After Snap IPO, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 13, 2018)
[hereinafter "FTSE'] (focusing on FTSE Russells decision to reconsider the question later).
The FTSE Russell is a unit of the London Stock Exchange Group plc. FTSE RUSSELL, About
Us, https://www.ftserussell.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/A2BR-RLJ8] (explaining that the
FTSE Russell is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the London Stock Exchange Group and is a
unit of the group's information services division).
101. Press Release, S & P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces
Decision on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules (Jul. 31, 2017), https://www.spiceindices.com/idpfiles/spice-assets/resources/public/documents/561162_spdjimulticlasssharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdflforcedownload=true
[https://perma.cc/G2MS-RZNG]; see also Caitlin Huston, S&P Dow Jones Indices Crack
Down on Multi-class Share Structures, MARKETWATCH
(Aug.
1,
2017),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/sp-dow-jones-indices-crack-down-on-multi-class-sharestructures-2017-08-01 [https://perma.cc/Q6AN-38ES] ("[T]he S&P Composite 1500, which
includes the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600, will no longer add
companies with multiple share class structures. . . .").
102. Trevor Hunnicutt, S&P 500 to Exclude Snap after Voting Rights Debate, REUTERS
(Jul.
31,
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-snap-s-p-idUSKBN1AH2RV
[https://perma.cc/L7AJ-G9N6].
CORP.

103. See Rachel Evans, Snap May Join MSCI Gauges after Indexer U-Turns on Voting
Rights, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 31, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporatelaw/snap-may-join-msci-gauges-after-indexer-u-turns-on-voting-rights
(quoting the MSCI
Index Policy Committee chairman as stating that many investors think the problem should
be dealt with by either regulators or stock exchanges).
104. Roku, Inc. Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 8 (Sept. 1, 2017). See Sherisse
Pham & Kaya Yurieff, Roku Shares Jump More than 50% in Trading Debut, CNN BUSINESS
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/technology/roku-ipo-price/index.html
[https://perma.cc/928F-7FG3] (noting strong investor demand for the company's shares when
the company went public on September 28, 2017).
105. Troy Wolverton, Roku's CEO and Other Insiders Will Control 98 Percent of the
Company's Voting Power Even after its IPO, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 18, 2017),
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public on October 6, 2017,106 allowing public shareholders only about
five percent of the company's voting rights, while almost seventy
percent of the voting power remained with founder Rob Roy.10 7
The Blue Apron Holdings, Inc. 108 and Dropbox, Inc. 109 IPOs used a
three-class share structure, with one-vote-per-share Class A shares on
June 29, 2017110 and March 23, 2018,111 respectively. In the case of
Dropbox, founders Drew Houston and Arash Ferdowski, as well as a
venture capital firm retained a significant chunk of the Class A shares,
but, more powerfully, a majority of the Class B super-voting (ten-votesper-share) stock. 1 1 2 In both cases, there is a third class of Class C
nonvoting stock.1 1 3 In addition, Houston, a founder and the CEO of
http://www.businessinsider.com/post-ipo-ceo-anthony-wood-will-have-32-of-rokus-votingpower-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/34PY-5Z7Q].
106. Switch, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Sept. 8, 2017). See Press Release,
Switch, Inc., Switch, Inc. Announces Closing of Initial Public Offering (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/switch-inc-announces-closing-of-initial-publicoffering-300536213.html [https://perma.cc/S5DN-RVBN] (noting that shares began trading
on the NYSE on October 6, 2017).
107. Reuters, This Tech IPO Is the Latest to Limit Rights of Small Investors, FORTUNE
2017),
http://fortune.com/20 17/10/05/switch-ipo-small-investors/
(Oct.
5,
[https://perma.cc/X92F-4CAJ].
108. See Blue Apron Holdings, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) at 10 (June 28,
2017) [hereinafter Blue Apron, Form S-1/A] (reflecting the pricing just before the S&P Down
Jones rule went into effect).
109. Dropbox, Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1/A) at 7 (Mar.
21, 2018) [hereinafter Dropbox, Inc., Form S-1/A].
110. See Seth Fiegerman, Blue Apron Serves Up Lukewarm IPO, CNN BUSINESS (June
29, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/29/technology/business/blue-apron-ipo/index.html
[https://perma.cc/PD8G-H84Z] (noting the stock's "flat performance" because it ended the
day at its IPO price of $10).
111. See Seth Fiegerman, Dropbox pops in Wall Street debut, CNN BUSINESS (Mar. 23,
2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/23/news/companies/dropbox-goes-public/index.html
[https://perma.cc/KDB8-SC6H] (noting the company's strong start in trading on the Nasdaq).
112. See Leslie Picker, Dropbox Sets Valuation as High as $8 Billion; Announces Private
Placement
by
Salesforce
Ahead
of
IPO,
CNBC
(Mar.
12,
2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/12/dropbox-sets-valuation-as-high-as-8-billion.html
[https://perma.cc/6ZPV-TP6E] (describing the terms for the planned IPO).
113. Blue Apron indicated that no Class C capital stock would be outstanding after the
offering. Blue Apron, Form S-1/A, supra note 110. It is unclear who owns the Class C capital
stock; however, the amended registration does indicate that in February 2017, Blue Apron
issued 42,687 shares of Class C capital stock as consideration for their purchase of the assets
of BN Ranch, LLC. Id. at 11-3. Dropbox indicated that no Class C common stock would be
outstanding after the offering and the concurrent private placement. Dropbox, Inc., Form S1/A, supra note 111, at 7. Additionally, Dropbox indicated that 41,368,326 shares of their
Class C common stock are to be reserved for future issuance under their 2018 Class C Stock
Incentive Plan (their 2018 Class C Plan), which will become effective prior to the completion
of the offering, and that 4,136,832 shares of their Class C common stock are to be reserved
for future issuance under their 2018 Class C Employee Stock Purchase Plan (their Class C
ESPP), which will become effective prior to the completion of the offering, but no offering
periods under the Class C ESPP will commence unless and until otherwise determined by
their Board of Directors. Id. at 10.

880

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:861

Dropbox, received a large stock package before the March 2018
offering. 1 1 4 Houston's stock vests on the attainment of certain stock
price milestones, and the share price must reach ninety dollars for him
to receive it all." Apparently, the better the company does, at least as
measured by share price, the less its owners care about their right to
control its management.
Other offerings have used different instruments to ensure ongoing
control by the founders. In February 2018, for example, the
shareholders of Spotify Technology SA, a music-streaming service,
issued special "beneficiary certificates" to its founders, Daniel Ek and
Martin Lorentzon. 116 The certificates carry voting power but no
economic interest,H7 and increased the founders' voting control to a
combined 80.5% (double their economic ownership).1 18 Two months
later, on April 3, 2018, Spotify (SPOT) went public, offering soundly
outvoted common stock.1 1 9

114. The stock package took the form of a restricted grant of 15.5 million shares, which
the company valued at $109.6 million figuring each share was worth about $7.07. The stock
willvest over four to 10 years, depending on the company's stock hitting certain price targets.
Weinberger and Price find that:
In addition to the restricted stock grant, Houston also owns 127 million shares
of Drop box's [sic] Class B stock, which offers greater voting power than the Class
A shares it plans to sell to the public. The company valued those shares at $7.01
a piece at the end of 2017, per the filing. That's worth about $891 million on its
own, at that price.
Matt Weinberger & Rob Price, Dropbox CEO Drew HoustonMade $110 million in 2017- and
Is on Track to Be Silicon Valley's Newest Billionaire after the IPO, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 23,
2018),
http://www.businessinsider.com/dropbox-ceo-drew-houston-salary-revealed-2018-2
[https://perma.cc/35FK-HHZ8].
115. See Winkler & Farrell, supra note 53.
116. Id.
117. Lucas Shaw, Spotify's Founders Aren't Giving Up Control Any Time Soon,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-2 1/spotify-sfounders-aren-t-giving-up-control-any-time-soon [https://perma.cc/396U-NLW4].
118. See Winkler & Farrell, supra note 53 (reporting that the certificates were issued
because co-founder and CEO Daniel Ek wanted to maintain control of the company).
119. Spotify Technology S.A., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 2 to Form F-1/A)
at 46-47 (Mar. 20, 2018), See Sara Salinas, Spotify Closes Up 13 Percent after Falling from
(Apr.
3,
2018)
Day
of
Trading,
CNBC
Highs
on
First
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/03/spotify-spot-ipo-stock-starts-trading-on-the-nyse.html
[https://perma.cc/KJ7L-NU4B] (noting that the IPO was a direct listing, with no banks
underwriting the offering, and began on April 3, 2018).
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The list goes on, 120 and there are reportedly others in the pipeline. 1 2 1
A recent study found that sixty-seven percent of U.S. venture-backed
technology companies that staged IPOs in 2017 had super-voting
shares for insiders. 1 2 2 In 2010, that percentage was only thirteen
percent for technology companies. 1 23 As Matt Levine explained in his
Bloomberg Money Stuff financial column:
The basic trade-off used to be that if I had an idea and you had
money, you would let me use your money, but in exchange you would
have the right to monitor and control what I did with it, and to fire
me if you thought I was doing a bad job. The new trade-off is, you

120. Zscaler Inc.'s March 16, 2018 IPO, though technically a single class of stock, still
retained 60% ownership with the insiders. Zscaler, Inc., Amended Registration Statement
(Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1/A) at 44 (Mar. 13, 2018); see Ciara Linnane, Zscaler Stock
Jumps 70% in TradingDebut in Positive Sign for Tech IPOs, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/zscaler-stock-jumps-70-in-its-trading-debut-2018-0316-11911234 [https://perma.cc/EA6X-WFQH] (identifying Zscaler as the first Silicon Valley
tech unicorn to go public in 2018). Pivotals April 20, 2018 dual-class share offering was
conducted in the shadow of Dell's 70% ownership stake. Pivotal Software, Inc., Registration
Statement (Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1/A) at 37 (Apr. 18, 2018); see Jonathan Vanian,

Pivotal CEO Rob Mee Talks Michael Dell and Cloud on IPO Day,

FORTUNE

(Apr. 20, 2018),

http://fortune.com/2018/04/20/pivotal-ipo-rob-mee/ [https://perma.cc/UBH7-VJ7E] (calling
the first day of trading "a modest success). For other recent S-1 filings with proposed dualclass structures, see generally: Domo, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 12 (June 1,
2018) (each share of Class A common stock is entitled to forty votes per share and each share
of Class B common stock is entitled to one vote per share); EverQuote, Inc., Registration
Statement (Form S-1) at 10 (June 1, 2018) (Class A common stock is entitled to one vote per
share and each share of Class B common stock is entitled to ten votes per share); Altair
Engineering, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 13-14 (June 4, 2018) (Class A
common stock is entitled to one vote per share, Class B common stock is entitled to ten votes
per share); U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc. Registration Statement (Amendment No. 2 to Form
S-1/A) at 12-13 (June 4, 2018) (Shares of Class A common stock are entitled to one vote per
share. Shares of Class B common stock are entitled to five votes per share).
121. Stripe, Inc.'s founders were recently given special super-voting (ten votes per share)
stock by its venture capital investors as an incentive to go public. See Winkler & Farrell,
supra note 53. WeWork Cos. Co-founder and CEO Adam Neumann holds 78% of the
company's class B shares, which come with super-voting rights and has been rumored to be
considering an IPO, although a 2017 $4.4 billion SoftBank investment delayed the need for
tapping the public markets. Id. In August 2018, SoftBank invested an additional $1 billion
in the company. See Arash Massoudi et al., SoftBank in Talks to Invest $10bn in We Work,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/1753e892-cc77-11e8-b276b9069bde0956 [https://perma.cc/J5FV-3WHW] (speculating that SoftBank is considering an
even larger infusion of cash in the company).
122. If one focuses on the largest technology companies (those valued at over $1 billion),
the proportion of companies that engaged in IPOs since May 2016 that featuring supervoting rights rises to 72%. Winkler & Farrell, supra note 53.
123. Id. In 2010, only 12% of all IPOs (technology and non-technology-related) contained
dual-class share structures. See Tom Zanki, Investors Urge Exchanges To Phase Out DualClass Voting, LAW360 (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/1095315/investorsurge-exchanges-to-phase-out-dual-class-voting
[https://perma.cc/W76Y-E7CH] (citing a
Dealogic study).
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let me use your money, and you are grateful that I deign to use your
money instead of someone else's. 12 4

So, why do shareholders buy these shares?
III. WHY SHOULD SHAREHOLDERS EXPECT TO MAKE MONEY?
The obvious reason to invest in stocks or anything else is to make
money. The legal question is: how do the owners of shares-a form of
property-make money from their property? 1 25 There are two
deceptively simple answers to the question: stock appreciation and
dividends. The Snap IPO puts both answers under considerable
pressure.
A.

Stock Appreciation and Faith in an Ever-Rising Market

"Stock appreciation" simply begs the question: if you invest in a
stock, why do you believe that somebody else will come to want the
stock more? Although stock markets have generally risen over time,
that is not true for all companies and that may not be true in a time
frame that is convenient for a particular investor. Let us assume,
however, you invest in stock with a rising price. The concept of stock
appreciation entails the existence of a subsequent purchaser willing to
pay more for your stock than you did. But why does the subsequent
purchaser want the stock? Does she believe that yet another
subsequent purchaser exists, who is willing to pay still more for the
stock? This rationale sounds like the greater fool theory, more
respectably known as the "theory of rational bubbles." 1 2 6 Belief in an
unending supply of greater fools does not appear to be the best
foundation for an investing strategy. In fact, at some point it seems to
suggest that stock markets are merely Ponzi schemes 1 27 in which
today's investor is dependent on tomorrow's new investor in order to
124. Matt Levine, Xerox CEO Showed Some Strategic Thinking, BLOOMBERG OPINION
(May 29, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-05-29/xerox-ceo-showedsome-strategic-thinking.
125. This question applies to shareholders as shareholders. Controlling shareholders
have lots of ways of making money from a company, notably by giving themselves jobs with
salaries.
126. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral
Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 491 (2006) (noting that "[t]he essence of the theory is that
it is rational to overpay for a stock if you believe that you can later sell the stock to someone
else and recoup your overpayment.").
127. A Ponzi scheme, named for the famous fraudster Charles Ponzi, involves
establishing an investment fund in which existing investors are paid using funds contributed
by new investors. Like most pyramid schemes, it requires continuous growth in order to keep
going. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PONZI SCHEMES-FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersponzihtm.html
[https://perma.cc/QF3C-Z37E]
(describing Ponzi schemes).
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achieve any return on her investment. That seems too much, and
presumably, in a post-Madoff market, 12 8 investors are on their guard
against such logic.
The orthodox answer is that equity investment is "sound" if it is
based on concrete business reasons and not on speculative mania. In
this vein, for example, CapitalOne helpfully suggests "investing in
companies you believe will make money." 12 9 Good businesses may be
expected to be profitable and grow in various ways, and therefore
become more valuable over time. Putting aside subsequent dilution, a
percentage of such a company (a fractional "share") grows
correspondingly by operation of accounting. So, if a shareholder owns
shares representing one percent of XYZ corporation, and XYZ
corporation doubles in size, her one percent stake represents twice as
much business. From this perspective, Snap's investors logically must
believe that Snap will do well, and thus their Snap shares will be worth
more when the investors choose to sell. Of course, Snap may or may
not do well, but an analysis of the strength of Snap's business model is
beside the point here. 13 0
The point is that the act of buying a share for investment entails an
implicit assumption that the company will do well and that the stock
will be "worth" more later. Further, it assumes that at that time,
someone or something will seek to purchase the stock from the
investor. But why is the stock's representation of a fraction of a
business worth anything? And if the stock is not worth anything, then
doubling the size of the business with more stock does not improve the
situation (2 x 0 = 0). In other words, what is the economic benefit of
owning stock? The classic but somewhat unsatisfying answer is
"dividends."131

128. Bernard L. Madoff famously perpetuated a $50 billion Ponzi scheme that went
undetected by regulators for a long time. In August 2009 the SEC Inspector General
submitted a highly critical 457-page report about the SEC's failure to detect Madoffs fraud.
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE
SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME (2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/stu

dies/2009/oig-509.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3Z6-44AR].
129. See CAPITALONE INVESTING, What Is a Stock and Why Buy Stocks?,
https://www.capitaloneinvesting.com/a/main/Education/KnowledgeCenter/What-is-a-Stockand-Why-Buy-Stocks [https://perma.cc/DPX7-VBMU] (explaining that shareholder rights
are probably not the reason to buy stocks).
130. It may be enough to point out that the smartphone app business sector is a crowded
one, and, as of December 11, 2018, Snap shares are trading at $5.86. Snap, Inc. (SNAP),
YAHOO! FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/SNAP/ [https://perma.cc/9C8N-HKB4].
131. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW
STUDENTS: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS § 8.6, at 200 (2d ed. 1998) (identifying
dividends as the basic way for investors to receive a financial return on their investment).
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B. Dividends
1. DirectorDiscretionand the Agency Problem
It may be said that investors buy stock with the expectation of
dividends, an occasional or even regular share of the profits of the
company that provide a return on their investment. 13 2 The decision of
whether or not to issue a dividend, however, is almost exclusively in
the discretion of the board of directors.1 3 3 Shareholders have no right
to a dividend. It is well established in corporate law that "the question
of whether or not a dividend is to be declared or a distribution of some
kind should be made is exclusively a matter of business judgment for
the board of directors." 13 4
Since Berle and Means published The Modern Corporation and
Private Propertyl35 in 1932, the core problem of the corporation has
been seen to stem from the core strength of the corporation: the
separation of ownership from control. 136 On the upside, businesses pool
capital and place it at the disposal of talented managers so that they
can do great things. On the other hand, the shareholder owners cannot
compel management (including the board) to do much of anything.1 3 7
Moreover, management has incentives to spend money on itself,
notably through high executive compensation, rather than make
money for the shareholders. 13 8 This has come to be called the agency
problem, under the notion that executives are the agents of

132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Morris Mendelson, Payout Policy and Resource Allocation, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 377, 377 (1968) ("Modern American corporate law clearly establishes the right of
corporate boards of directors to determine their own dividend policy.").
134. See Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S. 2d 807, 810 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)
(upholding the board decision regarding form and timing of dividend distribution to
shareholders).
135. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1991).
136. Id. at xi.
137. See generally Amy Deen Westbrook, Does Banking Law Have Something to Teach
Corporations Law About Directors'Duties? 55 WASHBURN L.J. 397 (2016) (explaining that
the business judgment rule and the hurdles of derivative shareholder litigation make it very
difficult for shareholders to compel any board action).
138. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably EmpiricalFoundationof the Common Law
of Corporations,27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 501 (2002) (noting that fiduciary duties should limit
the ability of directors to act in their own self-interest at the stockholders' expense). But see
Amy Deen Westbrook, Does the Buck Stop here? Board Responsibilityfor FCPA Compliance,
48 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 493, 497 (2016) (explaining that such fiduciary duties may not be
effective).
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shareholders. 13 9 Long story short, we would expect dividends to be
relatively low or nonexistent, and they are. 14 0
2. Dividends Are Not Debt
So, even investors who follow CapitalOne's sensible advice about
investing in shares of companies that make money may have no right
to that money and no right to a return on their investment. 1 4 1
Historically, the stocks that made up the backbone of our markets paid
steady dividends to their shareholders. 14 2 Between 1978 and 1999,
however, the number of companies issuing dividends annually fell
from roughly sixty-seven percent to twenty-one percent for NYSE,
NASDAQ, and American Stock Exchange companies. 143 Whether or
not companies pay dividends is often a result of the relative tax rates
on dividends and capital gains. 1 4 4 In addition, "dividends" are a
somewhat unsatisfying answer to the question of why to invest in
equities. For most of the last few generations, the income stream
derived from dividends (exclusive of appreciation) has been smaller
than the income derived from other investments, most notably less
risky government or even corporate debt. 1 45 Currently, a majority of
the S&P 500 stocks pay dividends to investors, but they are often

139. See generally Michael C. Jenson & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)
(reframing corporate governance in terms of the difficulties faced by shareholders in
monitoring, organizing, and disciplining managers ("agency costs")).
140. See infra Part III.B.2.
141. See Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S. 2d 807, 810 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)
(ruling that the question of whether a corporation declares a dividend or makes a
distribution of some kind to the shareholders is exclusively a matter of business judgment
for the board of directors).
142. Dividends in the S&P 500 index played a large role in terms of their contribution to
total returns during the 1940's, 1960's, and 1970's. Dividends played a smaller role during
the 1950's, 1980's, and 1990's. The Power of Dividends: Past, Present, and Future,
HARTFORDFUNDS.COM (2017), https://www.hartfordfunds.com/dam/en/docs/pub/

whitepapers/WP106.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY4Q-L5RP].
143. See Gustavo Grullon, Bradley Paye, Shane Underwood & James Weston, Has the
Propensity to Pay Out Declined? 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (2011); Eugene F.
Fama & Kenneth R. French, DisappearingDividends: Changing Firm Characteristicsor
Lower Propensity to Pay? 60 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2001).
144. See Ironman, Dividend Paying Companies in the S&P 500, BuS. INSIDER (July 15,
2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/dividend-paying-companies-in-the-sp-500-2014-7
[https://perma.cc/DVE3-YSV9] (finding that, in 2014, 425 of the companies in the S&P 500
were paying dividends).
145. See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 185
(1998) (recalling reactions in 1959 when dividend yields fell below bond yields); Alex
Rosenberg, The Ratio of Dividend Yields To Bond Yields In Historical Perspective, BIG
TRENDS (Jul. 15, 2016), https://www.bigtrends.com/education/the-ratio-of-dividend-yieldsto-bond-yields-in-historical-perspective [https://perma.cc/H8NC-HM7N].
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high technology companies pay few, if any,

dividends. 147 Alphabet/Google, Amazon, and Facebook have never paid
a dividend. 14 8
In sum, a share of common stock is not a bond, or even a debt-like
instrument (like a share of preferred stock). Common stock carries no
guarantee of dividend payment and, even if paid, dividends are often
relatively low. Therefore, it is a little odd to say that investors buy
stock because the board is likely to issue some dividend. Consequently,
shares of common stock appear to be a bad investment in terms of both
their return and the certainty of that return.
In his annual letters to the Berkshire Hathaway shareholders
Warren Buffett has frequently discussed management decisions
regarding whether to retain or distribute unrestricted earnings,
arguing that dividends should be paid unless management has a
reasonable prospect that the retained capital will produce incremental
earnings equal to, or above, those generally available to investors
through other investments. 149 Berkshire Hathaway is known for not
paying dividends.1 0 Indeed, there are benefits to not paying dividends,
including the fact that they are generally not deductible as a business
expense for the corporation."'
Nevertheless, the stock market keeps going. So the question
remains: why do investors buy shares?

146. For an overview of historical returns of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, see
Kamal Khondkar, Stock Market Yearly HistoricalReturns from 1921 to Present:Dow Jones
Index, TRADINGNINVESTMENT.COM (Jan. 20, 2018), https://tradingninvestment.com/stockmarket-historical-returns/ [https://perma.cc/7U7S-ZEY5].
147. See Fred Imbert, Investors Are Losing Out on Billions Because Tech Stocks Don't
Pay Dividends, CNBC.COM (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/06/investors-arelosing-out-on-billions-because-tech-dont-pay-dividends.html
[https://perma.cc/DM4W65DX] (arguing that if Alphabet, Amazon and Facebook, along with Berkshire Hathaway,
paid shareholder dividends at the 2.37% average yield of other S&P 500 companies that do
so, it would produce $32.2 billion for investors).
148. Id.
149. See Letter from Warren E. Buffett to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.,
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20121tr.pdf
at
19-21
(Mar.
1,
2013),
[https://perma.cc/H4DG-S7CU].
150. See Dan Caplinger, Will BerkshireHathawayFinally Pay aDividendin 2019?, THE
MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/01/20/will-berkshirehathaway-finally-pay-a-dividend-in.aspx
[https://perma.cc/STB9-ALWG]
(providing an
example of the perennial speculation that Berkshire Hathaway will finally pay a dividend
this year).
151. Cam Merritt, Corporate Taxation When Issuing Dividends, CHRON (2018),
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/corporate-taxation-issuing-dividends-66085.html
[https://perma.cc/V8KS-5RKD].
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IV. CORPORATE LAW DOES NOT PROTECT THESE SHAREHOLDERS

A.

CorporatePurpose and Shareholder Wealth Maximization

In theory, law could provide a solution to the agency problem. One
might think that corporate managers have a duty to return value to
the investors. Indeed, one might read the classic and frequently cited
1919 case of Dodge v. Ford in this fashion. 15 2 The Michigan court stated
that "[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders."1 53 This proposition has been widely
interpreted to mean that the purpose of a corporation is shareholder
wealth maximization, measured in financial terms. 15 4
More recently, in 2010, the Delaware Chancery Court in eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark reasoned from that familiar
proposition that the purpose of a for-profit corporation is to promote
shareholder value.1"' At least at first glance, the Delaware holding
appeared to "mandate profit maximization." 1 6 The case involved a
challenge by the auction site eBay, which was a minority shareholder
in the classified ad site Craigslist, to the decisions of two other
Craigslist shareholders, who were also the company's founders and
directors.1 57 In the eBay opinion, Chancellor Chandler indicated that
at least in the close corporation context of Craigslist, a corporate policy
is improper if it does not seek to maximize economic value for
stockholders. 158
As Joan Heminway recently noted, however, no state statutory
frameworks, including Delaware law and the Model Business
Corporations Act, "mention-no less require-management action in
a manner that maximizes shareholder wealth or value or compels
152. See Stefan J. Padfield, The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Opting Out of
Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 415, 423-24 (2017)
(finding that the Dodge v. Ford case had been cited in seventy-one cases by August 2017,
and that Dodge and eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. u. Newmark "are two of the cases most
often cited as evidence of a common law duty to maximize shareholder value").
153. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). See also David Millon,
Radical ShareholderPrimacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 1013, 1013-15 (2013) (suggesting that
there are two versions of shareholder primacy, radical and traditional, and that the radical
shareholder primacy concept which has emerged in the last 50 years is based on the premise
that corporate management is the agent of the shareholders and is thus required to
maximize current value to shareholders).
154. See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of ShareholderPrimacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951
(analyzing judicial discussion of shareholder profit maximization in cases between 1900 and
2016 and finding that courts have generally accepted the concept).
155. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010).

156. Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment
Rule, CorporatePurpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 409 (2013).
157. eBay Domestic Holdings, 16 A.3d at 6-7.
158. Id. at 34.
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shareholder primacy."'1 9 Professor Heminway pointed out that "none
of this decisional law-not even the seminal, foundational Dodge
opinion-substantiates an enforceable, judicially imposed legal
obligation to maximize shareholder financial wealth in ordinarycourse decision-making." 16 0
Lyman Johnson expressed similar concerns in the wake of the eBay
decision, noting Chancellor's Chandler's struggle in the opinion to find
"some legal foundation for his view." 16 1 Professor Johnson explained
that Chancellor Chandler relied on the simple fact that Craigslist was
a "'for-profit' corporation," 16 2 although the opinion "did not go on to
explain how being a 'for-profit' corporation meant a company had to
maximize' profits, as opposed to making (or seeking or enhancing)
profits." 163 Moreover, even if the management is bound to operate a
"for-profit" company for a profit, as opposed to for charity, just how
does that benefit shareholders?
In eBay, the Court prevented Craigslist from adopting a poison pill,
and from encumbering eflay's shares in Craigslist, because neither
action could be justified in terms of maximizing shareholder value. 1 6 4
The court's decision, however, did not affect the management of
Craigslist's business.16 1 In particular, Craigslist was not obliged to
monetize its business in accordance with eflay's desire for wealth
maximization, nor did the court force Craigslist to give eflay more
value.1 6 6 In fact, the court likened Craigslist to "David" and eflay to

159.

See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of

Statutes, DecisionalLaw, and OrganicDocuments, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 948 (2017)
(demonstrating that neither state corporate law nor judicial decisions mandate shareholder
wealth maximization as the purpose of the corporation). In fact, as Professor Heminway
points out, in a number of states that do not mimic either Delaware law or apply the Model
Business Corporations Act, there are now so-called 'other constituency' statutes which
explicitly allow consideration of more than shareholder wealth.

Id. at 948-49.
160. Id. at 951.
161. Johnson, supranote 156, at 444.
162. Id.
163. Id. Professor Johnson explains that Craigslist had been providing significant
financial returns to its investors, although possibly not the maximum profit. Id. at 443.
164. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010).
Chancellor Chandler stated that the Craigslist founders/directors "did not make a serious
attempt to prove that the Craigslist culture, which rejects an attempt to further monetize its
services, translates into increased profitability for stockholders." Id.
165. Id. at 48 (Del. Ch. 2010) (only rescinding the rights plan and the right of first
refusal/dilutive issuance).
166. Id.
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"Goliath." 167 Years later, eBay sold its stake in Craigslist back to

Craigslist. 168
As Warren Buffet noted, management can do any number of things
with the company's profit: reinvest it, raise salaries, maintain its cash
reserves, etc.16 9 So the real question for shareholders is not whether
the company is for profit, but whether the law provides shareholders
with any judicially enforceable rights to the profits generated by the
company. If so, what rights? It seems incredible that investors were
willing to spend $3.4 billion in the Snap offering based on their
assurance that the company was "for-profit," would be managed
accordingly, and that such profits would ultimately go to

shareholders.

170

B. ProceduralDifficulties
1.

Berle and Means: The Ideal

Again, in theory, Snap's investors could be relying on the very
traditional idea that Snap's directors and officers 171 have a fiduciary
duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. 172 Indeed, in confronting the agency problem, Berle and
Means argued for enhanced fiduciary duties.1 7 3 They maintained that
courts should protect shareholders, which one might think entailed the
proposition that the law requires that the money earned by the
business was actually transferred to the owners.
167.
168.

Id. at 25.
Leena Rao, eBay Sells a Coveted PrizeBack to Craigslist,Ending Long Legal Battle,
FORTUNE
(Jun.
19,
2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/06/19/ebay-craigslist-stake-buy/
[https://perma.cc/QVP5-386U].
169. For an explanation of Buffett's approach to dividend and share repurchases as
outlined in his annual letters, see LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN
BUFFETT, 178-88 (3d ed. 2013).
170. See Fiegerman, supra note 15.
171. Professor Johnson notes the distinction between the duties of, and protections for,
corporate directors and corporate officers. Generally, the business judgment rule applies
clearly to directors, and the way in which it is applied to corporate officers is less clear. See,
e.g., Lyman P. Q. Johnson, CorporateOfficers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW.
439 (2005).
172. See generally Victor Brudney, Contract and FiduciaryDuty in CorporateLaw, 38
B. C. L. REV. 595 (1997) (exploring the background of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in the
context of a publicly traded corporation). The question of whether the duty is owed to the
shareholders or to the company itself has been the subject of substantial scholarship. See
e.g., Heminway, supra note 159, at 952-53.
173. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 248 (rev. ed. 1991). See also William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered
at the Century's Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737 (2001) (concluding that Berle and Means's
understanding of fiduciary standards as a primary concern in corporate governance has
played a critical role in shaping corporate-fiduciary law).
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State corporation laws, however, have developed differently. As
discussed below, over time, legal requirements on corporations and
their managers have been lowered, and it has become much harder for
shareholders to sue. 17 4 In practice, if not often explicitly, the fiduciary
duty of managers to shareholders has been greatly reduced.175
1 76
2. Shareholder Remedies: Delaware
and the Business
Judgment Rule

Even if the corporation's managers violate their fiduciary duties in
fact, shareholders may have a hard time enforcing their rights in court.
State corporation laws, led by Delaware,1 7 7 have expanded the reach
and depth of the business judgment rule. 17 8 The business judgment
rule, a "cornerstone concept" in the judicial review of corporate
conduct, 17 9 is "a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of

174. In the 1970s, in fact, Bayless Manning called corporation laws "towering
skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind."
Bayless Manning, The Shareholder'sAppraisalRemedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE
L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962) (arguing that corporation law as a field of intellectual effort was
dead). For a more extended discussion of the reduction in corporation law requirements, see
Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardiansand the Concentrationof
the U.S. Equity Markets, 96 NEB. L. REV. 688, 698-712 (2018). For a fuller discussion of the
difficulties shareholders confront when suing a corporation, see Amy Deen Westbrook,
Double Trouble: Collateral ShareholderLitigation Following Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct
Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1228-1232 (2012) (explaining that shareholder
derivative suits face substantial procedural hurdles.
175. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 175 at 248. Judicial application of fiduciary duties to
constrain the board of directors has been diplomatically characterized as "gentle." Bernard
S. Sharfman, The Tension between Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Law, 12 J. L.
ECON. & POL'Y 251, 253 (2016). For a more extended discussion of the failure of fiduciary
duty doctrine to constrain managers, see Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 176, at 703
(2018) (arguing that economic and legal developments in the last decades have combined to
concentrate control over the equity markets); Westbrook, supra note 139, at 404-05
(discussing a higher standard of fiduciary duty being imposed in some recent banking law
cases).
176. Delaware is the established leader in the development and interpretation of
corporation law. For a thoughtful discussion of Delaware's dominance, see William J.
Carney, Larry Ribstein's Federalism Scholarship and the Unfinished Agenda, 2014 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1603 (2014) (discussing the late Professor Ribstein's scholarship relating to corporate
choice of law).
177. For an analysis of the significance of Delaware in the development of U.S.
corporation law, see Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate
Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2013) (finding that the significance of Delaware in the
shaping of corporate governance was substantial but not decisive).
178. For a fuller discussion of the business judgment rule, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Business Judgment Rule as an Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004) (offering
a theory to explain the function and utility of the rule).
179. Johnson, supranote 171, at 453.
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the company."1 8 0 Unless plaintiff shareholders can rebut the
presumption, courts have refused to second-guess a board's business
decision if that decision can be "attributed to any rational business
purpose."18 1 Though shareholders on occasion have suffered, courts
have reasoned that more aggressive judicial policing of business
judgment would chill risk-taking, entrepreneurship, innovation, and
other behavior that might benefit shareholders. 1 8 2 As Professor
Johnson aptly quoted, "[the business judgment rule], which began as
a minor exception, is now so dominant a winning argument that the
only fun left is trying to prove that [it] . . . does not cover absolutely all
forms of corporate theft." 1 83
Judicial deference is based at least in part on the statutory rules of
corporation law. Delaware law explicitly provides that "[t]he business
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors." 1 8 4 Arguably,
in enforcing the business judgment rule, courts have merely been
ensuring that, in the absence of self-dealing or other disabling conflicts
of interest, corporate managers are left free to manage. A great deal of
scholarship and commentary, however, suggests that such freedom
restricts shareholders' ability to influence their investment.1 85

180. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on othergrounds, Brehm
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). Arguably, the strength of the business judgment rule, to
the extent that it reduces the accountability of corporate managers, may operate as a
counterbalance to the shareholder wealth maximization requirement. See Stefan J. Padfield,
The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Opting Out of Shareholder Wealth
Maximization, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BuS. L. 415, 424 (2017).
181. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n. 65-66 (Del. 2000).
182. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(nothing that "to employ a [rule other than the business judgment rule]-one that permitted
an 'objective' evaluation of the [board] decision-would expose directors to substantive
second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries, which would, in the long-run, be injurious
to investor interests.").
183. Johnson, supra note 171, at 439 (quoting David Bazelon, Clients Against Lawyers,
HARPER'S MAG., Sept. 1967, at 104, 112). Of course, there have been calls for courts to
consider more carefully whether deference to the business judgment rule is warranted. See,
e.g., Bernard S. Sharfman, The Tension between Hedge Fund Activism and CorporateLaw,
12 J. L. ECON. & POL'Y 251 (2016).
184. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 141(a) (2011).
185. See Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Unequal Voting and the Business
Judgment Rule, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 7, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/07/unequal-voting-and-the-business-judgmentrule/ [https://perma.cc/5F4H-KAH4]; Elson and Ferrere note:
Across the expanse of time and knowledge, judges are unable to substitute their
business judgment for that of experienced corporate management. Thus, while
heightened review might be doctrinally prudent, it is practically unfeasible. The
result will be a growing number of dual-class companies that are unaccountable
to shareholders, the markets, and the courts.
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More technically, the procedural evolution of the shareholder
derivative suit has made it virtually impossible for shareholders to
enforce rights against management in the absence of outright
wrongdoing. 186 Under Delaware law, the requirement-that
shareholders suing in a derivative law suit make a pre-suit demand on
the board of directors, or demonstrate that such demand would have
been futile- 187 is a nearly insurmountable barrier, and results in the
early dismissal of the majority of derivative suits. 188

In theory, and sometimes in practice, a derivative remedy can be
pursued successfully by alleging "self-dealing" with respect to a
particular transaction.189 Self-dealing constitutes a violation of a
director's fiduciary duty of loyalty, and avoids the messy argument
over whether the director's behavior can be exculpated based on a
clause in the corporation's certificate of incorporation. 9 0 In addition, a

Id. See also Aurelia Gurrea-Martinez, Re-examining the Business Judgment Rule from a
ComparativePerspective: Is it Really in the Shareholders'Interest?,THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Feb. 26, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/02/26/re-examining-the-businessjudgment-rule-from-a-comparative-perspective-is-it-really-in-the-shareholders-interest/
[https://perma.cc/65YE-2DXV] ("From the shareholders' perspective, this authority of the
board of directors [derived from the business judgment rule] means that they will virtually
have no powers to intervene in the business affairs of the corporation, even with regard to
some 'hybrid' decisions such as a hostile takeover, where heightened agency problems may
arise between managers and shareholders."); Paramount Commc'ns. Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989
WL 79880 at *30 (Del. Ch. 1989) ("The value of a shareholder's investment, over time, rises
or falls chiefly because of the skill, judgment and perhaps luck-for it is present in all human
affairs-of the management and directors of the enterprise.").
186. Securities law tells a subtler story that can be bracketed for now. For a fuller
discussion of this issue, see generally Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 175.
187. Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1(a) ("The complaint shall also allege with particularity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the
directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort."); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2016) ("No shareholder
may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a written demand has been made upon the
corporation to take suitable action..."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816-18 (Del. 1984)
(requiring that, to demonstrate demand futility, plaintiff shareholders must allege at the
pleading stage particularized facts that show a reasonable doubt that the directors are
disinterested and independent and plaintiff shareholders must show a reasonable doubt that
the challenged transaction was a product of a valid exercise of business judgment).
188. Lenois v. Lawal, No. 11963-VCMR, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 784, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov.
7, 2017) (plaintiffs derivative claims dismissed for failure to make a demand on the board);
In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Shareholder Litig., 906 A.2d 808, 812 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(plaintiffs failed to adequately argue demand futility; therefore, the plaintiffs derivative
claim was dismissed and demand was not excused). For additional discussion of the difficulty
in pursuing a shareholder derivative suit, see Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 175; Amy

Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation Following Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1217 (2012); Westbrook, supra note
175, at 404-05.

189. See generally Anne Tucker Nees, Who's the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability
with the CorporatePower, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 2121-235 (2010).
190. Id.
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director's conflict of interest transaction generally entitles a
challenging shareholder to a standard of review with more possibility
of success than the shareholder would have if the court applied the
business judgment rule.' 9' There are plenty of ways in which the
directors or officers of a company can operate, however, that are
unpalatable for shareholders but do not constitute "self-dealing." 1 92
And, even in the case of self-dealing, the cumbersome, expensive, timeconsuming, and uncertain litigation may effectively preclude a
shareholder's suit to enforce her rights.
C. Appraisal Rights and Minority Shareholder Protections
So far, there seems to be no reason for a shareholder to believe that
Snap, or any other corporation for that matter, is legally required to
deliver money back to its investors. Return on investment seems to be
a mere hope.
In the context of a merger, however, if a number of requirements
are met, shareholders who feel that they have received unfair
compensation for their shares generally have the remedy of appraisal
rights. 193 Appraisal rights empower dissenting shareholders to petition
the court to appraise their shares, and then to have the corporation

191. Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 173 (Del. Ch. 2005) (if one
of the safe harbor provisions of title 8, § 144 of the Delaware Code is satisfied, the business
judgment rule applies; if none of the safe harbor provisions of title 8, § 144 of the Delaware
Code are satisfied, entire fairness review applies); See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2013)
(an interested transaction will not automatically be void or voidable solely because of the
director's interest if there has been informed, disinterested, board approval, or informed
shareholder approval, or the transaction is fair to the corporation); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ch. 8, subch. F, introductory cmt. (2016) (addressing legal challenges based on director
conflict of interest only and applying only when there is a "transaction" by or with the
corporation); Id. § 8.70(a)(1), official cmt. 238 (noting that the provision "provides a safe
harbor for a director or officer weighing possible involvement with a prospective business
opportunity that might constitute a 'corporate opportunity'").
192. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A. 2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (holding that
dividends paid out by the parent company in excess of subsidiaries' earnings and the parent
company's allocation of business opportunities to entities other than the subsidiary did not
constitute self-dealing). For a general survey of this area of the law in Delaware, see Lewis

H. Lazarus & Brett M. McCartney, Standardsof Review in Conflict Transactionson Motions
to Dismiss: Lessons Learnedin the Past Decade, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 967 (2011).
193.

tit. 8,

§

262(a)-(b) (2013). Steven Haas & Charles Brewer,
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP (Nov. 2017),
https://www.hunton.com/images/content/3/4/v2/34138/nonvoting-common-stock.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VVA7-MSHD]. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law § 262(a),
"[a]ny stockholder of a corporation of this State who [complies with the requirements of
Section 262] shall be entitled to an appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of
the stockholder's shares of stock" (emphasis added). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2013).
See also id. § 363(b) (granting appraisal rights to stockholders who have not "voted in favor
of' an amendment of its certificate of incorporation or merger to become a public benefit
corporation).
DEL. CODE ANN.

Nonvoting Common Stock: A Legal Overview,
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buy those shares at the appraised value plus prejudgment interest. 1 9 4
The number of cases in which shareholders seek an appraisal remedy
has increased dramatically, from two to three percent of eligible deals
in the early 2000s, 1 " to approximately twenty-five percent between
2010 and 2014,196 making appraisal a more credible threat and
increasing its impact on corporate management.1 97 For example, in
considering the merger of Delphi Financial Group, Inc. with Tokio
Marine Holdings Inc. in 2011, the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled
that the controlling shareholder breached his fiduciary duty by
extracting a control premium for his shares, even though the
certificate of incorporation specifically stated that both classes of stock
should be treated equally in the event of a merger.1 9 8
There has been some question of whether nonvoting shareholders
have an appraisal rights remedy, but the better view seems to be that
they do; "nonvoting stockholders are entitled to appraisal rights in a
merger to the same extent as voting stockholders." 199 Assuming that
nonvoting shares have appraisal rights, such rights provide scant
assurance for shareholders seeking a return on investment. It seems
far-fetched to think that an investor invests in reliance on the hope
that the company is the target of an eligible merger, 2 00 and then either
(i) the premium offered by the acquiring company is completely
194. Wei Jiang et al., Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.
L. & ECON. 697, 697 (2016).
195. Id. at 699.
196. This maybe partially the result of so-called "appraisal arbitrage," a relatively recent
development in which hedge funds purchase shares of known merger targets solely to pursue
(or threaten to pursue) an appraisal remedy. See Abigail Pickering Bomba et al., New Activist
Weapon - the Rise of DelawareAppraisal Arbitrage: A Survey of Cases and Some Practical
Implications,
FRIED
FRANK
(June
18,
2014),
http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/FINAL%20%206182014%20TOC%20Memo%20-%20New%20Activist%20Weapon-%20The%20Rise%20of'o20Delaware%20Appraisal%20Arbitrage.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QY3E-8WYR].
197. Jiang, supra note 194, at 699. Note, however, that even in this environment of
increased assertion of appraisal rights, it is estimated that such actions still account for only
one of every twenty merger-related lawsuits. Charles Kormso & Minor Myers, Reforming
ModernAppraisal Litigation, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 279, 282 (2017).
198. In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S'holder Litig., 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6,
2012).
199. Haas & Brewer, supra note 195 (footnote omitted). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 262(a)-(b) (2013).
200. Note that only some mergers would be eligible mergers. John Marsalek, 2016
Amendments to the Delaware General CorporationLaw, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (Jul. 7,
2017), https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/07/
2016-delaware-general-corporation-law-amendments [https://perma.cc/V6X6-PAEM]
(noting the difference between short-form mergers, which do not require stockholder
approval, and long-form mergers, which require a proxy statement and a stockholder
meeting).
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satisfactory, or (ii) the premium offered is so inadequate she can
pursue a remedy in the Delaware courts (which may take one to three
years of litigation). 2 0 1 Presumably, the risk of appraisal rights
litigation has a disciplining effect on a controlling founder who agrees
to an eligible merger. 2 02 In addition, some scholars have noted that an
appraisal action still compares favorably to litigation based on
management breach of fiduciary duties. 2 03 But again, following
CapitalOne's advice, surely most public equity market investments are
made under the assumption that a business will be successful, and
investors will profit from that success?
V. THE MARKET DOES NOT PROTECT THESE SHAREHOLDERS

A.

The Market for CorporateControl

If the courts provide little or no assurance that a shareholder will
benefit from her investment, perhaps the market does? In a quintet of
articles published in the 1960s,

20 4

Henry Manne described two systems

of corporate governance: "law" and "economics." 205 "Law," as discussed
above, does not really protect shareholders, leaving the question of
why one would invest at all. Manne found the same to be true in the
1960s: "in the present posture of the law, the derivative suit, whatever
its potential, is not furnishing a great deal of direct protection for
shareholder interests." 2 0 6
Manne maintained via a great phrase that shareholders were
protected not by law, but by "the market for corporate control." 2 07 If
201. Jiang, supranote 194, at 697.
202. Courts do assign a market value to shares with no enforceable claim on the profits
of the business, and in spite of the market for corporate control operating through the merger
itself, but why should they?
203. Jiang, supranote 194, at 698.
204. Henry Manne, The 'HigherCriticism'of the Modern Corporation,62 COLUM. L. REV.
399 (1962) [hereinafter Manne, The Higher Criticism]; Henry Manne, Some Theoretical
Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964)
[hereinafter Manne, Theoretical Aspects]; Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for
CorporateControl, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) [hereinafter Manne, Mergers]; Henry Manne,
Our Two CorporationSystems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967) [hereinafter
Manne, Our Two CorporationSystems]; Henry Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares A
Reply to ChairmanCohen, 1967 DUKE L. J. 231. For a comprehensive treatment of Professor
Manne's impact on legal scholarship, see William J. Carney, The Legacy of "The Market for
CorporateControl" and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215
(1999) (discussing all five of Professor Manne's articles published during this period, and
providing anecdotal, doctrinal, and empirical evidence of their impact).
205. For an explanation of Professor Manne's dual theory of corporations, see generally
Manne, Our Two CorporationSystems, supra note 204.
206. Manne, The Higher Criticism, supra note 204, at 410.
207. This phrase is most commonly associated with Professor Manne's 1965 article
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, although the concept was introduced in his
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management is as bad as Berle and Means worried, then shareholders
can band together and elect directors who represent their own
interests. 2 0 8 More specifically, shareholders would elect, presumably
through a proxy fight, directors who would declare a dividend. 2 0 9
If-as is often the case-transaction costs prevent shareholders
from banding together, then an economic opportunity exists. 2 1 0 A
stronger firm could merge with the badly managed firm. 2 1 1 More
dramatically, an outside party could buy shareholder votes, perhaps
enough of a stake to affect elections. 2 12 If the opportunity was enticing
enough, the party could buy enough shares to elect new directors,
reorganize the corporation, and make money.213 The result would be a
takeover. 2 1 4 The increased profits, plus the opportunity to sell the
shares at a higher price, would motivate investors to look for badly
managed firms.
Sometimes proxy fights, mergers, and takeovers do in fact happen.
More commonly, managers, who presumably want to keep their good
jobs, are disciplined by the threat of takeovers into looking out for
shareholders. 2 15 Knowing this, shareholders rationally want to own
stock. 2 1 6 Or so argued Manne and his intellectual progeny. 217
B.

The Market for CorporateControl Requires Shareholder Voting

The extent to which the market for corporate control successfully
addressed the agency problem animated over a generation of
corporation law scholarship. 2 1 8 For present purposes, however, it is
critical to note that the market for corporate control does not existeven in principle-in the case of Snap. 2 1 9 In fact, it does not exist, at
1962 article, The 'HigherCriticism'ofthe Modern Corporation. Manne, Mergers, supra note
204, at 110.; see also Manne, The Higher Criticism, supranote 204.
208. Manne, Mergers, supra note 206, at 114; Manne, The Higher Criticism, supra note
206, at 405.
209. Manne, The Higher Criticism, supra note 158, at 405.
210. Manne, Mergers, supranote 206, at 113.
211. Id. at 112.
212. Manne, TheoreticalAspects, supra note 206, at 1432-33.
213. Manne, Mergers, supranote 206, at 113.
214. Id.
215. Manne, The Higher Criticism, supra note 206, 412-13.
216. Manne, Mergers, supranote 206, at 113. "Only the take-over scheme provides some
assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate managers and thereby affords strong
protection to the interests of vast numbers of small, non-controlling shareholders." Id.
217. George Priest, Henry Manne and the Market Measure of Intellectual Influence, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325, 329 (1999) (discussing Manne's influence).
218. See id. (laying out the influence of Manne's theory of a market for corporate control).
219. See supra Part II (explaining that the Snap shares offered to the public have no
voting rights).
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least in practice, in other important high technology companies. 2 2 0
Google, for example, is not vulnerable to a takeover bid-that is the
entire point of its hierarchical shareholding arrangements. 2 2 1
The "economics" in Manne's argument is very dependent on "law."
The "market for corporate control" is a market for a property right, the
right to vote for the board of directors who can hire and fire managers
and hence control what the company does. 2 2 2 That is, with enough
votes, one has the ability to control both the operations and the
treasury of the firm. 2 23
But shares in Snap do not have voting rights. 2 2 4 A corporate raider
could buy all of the Snap common shares but would still have no way
to replace the board or access the firm's value. The market for
corporate control is a market for votes. There is no public market for
corporate control in Snap, Google, or Facebook, or any of the other
companies discussed in Part II above. 2 25 The Snap Registration
Statement is explicit:
This concentrated control could delay, defer, or prevent a change of
control, merger, consolidation, or sale of all or substantially all of
our assets that our other stockholders support. Conversely, this
concentrated control could allow our co-founders to consummate
such a transaction that our other stockholders do not support. In
addition, our co-founders may make long-term strategic investment
decisions and take risks that may not be successful and may
seriously harm our business. 2 2 6
Interestingly, voteless shares are not only the logical terminus of
the market for corporate control but also appear at the conception of
the idea. For various reasons beyond the scope of this article, business
theorist Peter Drucker and influential law professors Abram Chayes
and Bayless Manning, proposed abolishing the ritual of shareholder

220. See supra Part II (explaining that many high technology companies have a dualclass share structure that prevents holders of the publicly traded common stock from
exercising any meaningful voting control).
221. "[W]e have set up a corporate structure that will make it harder for outside parties
to take over or influence Google." Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at iii (Apr.
29, 2004).
222. See Manne, Theoretical Aspects, supra note 206, at 1430 ("An individual voting
share of stock is a package composed of two parts - an underlying investment interest and a
vote.").
223. Id.
224. See supra Part II.
225. See supra Part II.
226. Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1/A) at 20 (Feb. 24,
2017).
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that outsiders could not buy votes and
management, and shareholders would
managers.
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In 1962, in the earliest of his
voteless shares would mean
reap the gains of improved
thus be at the mercy of

8

To summarize: neither law nor economics gives investors in Snap
any assurance that they will share Snap's business gains, should the
company be successful. In fact, Snap investors and the public investors
in the many recent dual-class offerings may not be able to influence
corporate matters in any direct way. 2 2 9
At this point, the objections to the Snap IPO and other dual-class
offerings are clear. But many investors nonetheless invested. 23 0 As
Institutional Shareholder Services observed in response to the
Facebook IPO, investors confront "a Hobson's choice: accept
governance structures which diminish shareholder rights and board
accountability or miss out on what appears to be one of the hottest
business models of the internet age." 231
VI. SNAPCHAT'S GIFT

A.

Introduction

The investors in the Snap IPO transferred several billion dollars to
the company without any reliable mechanism to compel a return on
their investment. It is tempting to call such a transfer "a gift." But
227. See Manne, The Higher Criticism, supra note 204, at 409. Abe Chayes was a mentor
to both of the authors, albeit in international law.
228. Id. at 410-13 (1962). See Carney, supra note 204, at 233-34.
229. This was brought home to Groupon investors in 2012 following its accounting
restatements. Founders Andrew Mason, Eric Lefkowsky and Brad Keywell controlled 100%
of the Class B common stock and over a third of the Class A common stock, thus preventing
any shareholder-sponsored management change. Therese Poletti, IPO Investors: Beware the
Dual-Class Stock, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 5, 2012), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
ipo-investors-beware-the-dual-class-stock-2012-04-05
[https://perma.cc/TPV5-26XU]. But
see Joan Macleod Heminway, Selling Crowdfunded Equity: A New Frontier,70 OKLA. L. REV.
189 (2017).
230. In fact, the result has been some large investors objecting to the index funds'
restrictions. For example, Blackrock Inc. informed its clients that some investment returns
could suffer as the result of the exclusions imposed by S&P Dow Jones and FTSE Russell
indexes. Blackrock reportedly said that "policy makers, not index compliers, should set
equity investing and corporate governance standards." Nick Baker et al., MSCI Extends
Review of Whether to Ban Multiple-Class Stocks, BLOOMBERG BNA CORP.
L. & ACCOUNTABILITY
REP.,
HTTPS://WWW.BLOOMBERG.COM/NEWS/ARTICLES/
2017-11-02/MSCI-EXTENDS-REVIEW-OF-WHETHER-TO-BAN-MULTIPLE-CLASS-STOCKS
(last
updated Nov. 6, 2017).
231. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, THE TRAGEDY OF THE DUAL CLASS
COMMONS
1 (2012), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/facebookO2l4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6K6U-PUUF].
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what is a gift? It is certainly not a unilateral transfer, at least not
here.2 32 Even in the contemporary United States, a gift creates some
expectation of reciprocation, albeit often under the heading of manners
rather than legal obligation. 23 3 For their part, the Snap investors
presumably expect the management of Snap to do well by them in
return, in other words, to run the company in the shareholders'
interest and enable them to share in eventual profits. So perhaps we
require a more sophisticated understanding of the term "gift," or more
generally, the social obligations created by exchanges. For that, we
return to Mauss.
B. The Seriousness of Giving
In the social systems Mauss discussed, gifts were viewed very
seriously. Gifts were given to establish relative importance and
position, and they were reciprocated for the same reason. 23 4 Far from
free gestures of affection, gifts were highly constrained and
obligatory. 235 Exchanging "total services" and "counter-services" was
"strictly compulsory, on pain of private or public warfare." 23 6
For example, Mauss described the system of contractual gifts in
Samoa, which followed marriage, birth, circumcision, sickness, a
daughter's arrival at puberty, funeral rights, or trade. 237 In the
Samoan potlatch system, Mauss found that honor, prestige, and
232. For a discussion of Mauss, and the role of the gift, in the context of international
bribery and corruption, see generally Timothy L. Fort & James J. Noone, Gifts, Bribes, and
Exchange: Relationshipsin Non-Market Economies and Lessons for Pax E-Commercia, 33
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 515 (2000) (arguing among other things that nothing is a "gift" and that
there is always self-interest involved based on the social context).
233. The legal academy has also explored the idea of gifts, particularly the possibility
that people gain utility from acting altruistically. Richard A. Posner, GratuitousPromisesin
Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 411-12 (1977). Contract law has long struggled
with the enforceability of gratuitous promises without (apparent) consideration. Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1979).
234. MAUSS, supra note 1, at 52. See also discussion supranote 170 (noting that this idea
has been explored by the legal academy in the context of gratuitous promises). In his 1997
article, Eric Posner discussed an expanded world of gift-giving motivation that included not
just altruism but the more self-serving ideas of increasing the donor's status and creating or
enhancing trust relations between the donor and the recipient. Eric A. Posner, Altruism,
Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and GratuitousPromises, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 567, 57282 (1997). See also Robert A Prentice, "Law &" GratuitousPromises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
881, 888 (2007). Professor Prentice discusses the observations of Wright, who observed that
reciprocal altruism "is fundamental to life in all cultures." Id. at 889 (quoting ROBERT
WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: WHY WE ARE THE WAY WE ARE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 202 (1994)).

235. MAUSS, supra note 1, at 4. Mauss also explained the role of destruction, of sacrifice
in order to receive a reciprocal, spiritual, benefit. See, e.g., id. at 20. Discussion of destruction
as a form of gift, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
236. Id. at 7.
237. Id. at 11.
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spiritual power were expressed by wealth; the failure to reciprocate
gifts resulted in the loss of spiritual power, "the talisman and source
of wealth that is authority itself." 23 8 In the same vein, the North
American Tlingit and Haida may have carried the potlatch the
furthest, outdoing the Melanesian gift systems in "the violence,
exaggeration, and antagonisms that it arouse [d] ."239 "The goal is above
all a moral one, the object being to foster friendly feelings between two
persons in question.... 240
The need to foster friendship raises the possibility of enmity; giving
is a grave business. "Nobody is free to refuse the present that is offered.
Everyone, men and women, tries to . . . outdo one another in
generosity." 241 In discussing the role of the gift in classical Hindu law,
Mauss explained: "[t]he gift is therefore at one and the same time what
should be done, what should be received, and yet which is dangerous
to take." 2 4 2 He further explains, "[t]his is because the thing that is
given itself forges a bilateral, irrevocable bond." 2 43
Less dramatically, even though Snap shareholders lack a legal
right to compel behavior by Snap managers, shareholders undertake
the risk of investment and thereby connect to managers. 244 Exchange
forms bonds and weaves the social fabric. Investment makes people

238.
239.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 45.

240. Id. at 24-5 (quoting A.R. RADCLIFFE BROWN, THE ANDAMAN ISLANDERS: A STUDY IN
SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 73, 83 (1922)).
241. Id. at 25 (quoting A.R. RADCLIFFE BROWN, THE ANDAMAN ISLANDERS: A STUDY IN
SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 73, 81 (1922)).

242. Id. at 76.
243.

Id. See PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A NATURAL HISTORY OF

ECONOMICS 148 (2004) (explaining that for Mauss, "the nature of obligation incurred on
receipt of a gift was not determined wholly or even primarily by the nature of the goods
received but owed a great deal to relative status, and to other social and emotional links
between donor and recipient").
244. Scholars have long emphasized the relational aspects of reciprocity. For example:
From a relational perspective, however, individual intentions are not all that
matters: a relation is characterized by the two (or more) persons linked and by
the kind of link they have. This perspective . . . is better suited to discuss the
implications of individuals' social identity (and also of groups' identity), because
it makes it easy to recognize that establishing a certain kind of link (say,
reciprocal, but also altruistic) with a certain kind of person (or group) also affects
my own identity, at least in its social component, and, . . . the choice of one's
social identity may be the most relevant economic decision, which then drives all
other economic choices.
Pier Luigi Sacco et al., The Economics of Human Relationships, in HANDBOOK OF THE
ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY 697 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean

Mercier Ythier eds., 2006).
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part of the company (which in English is another word for guest). 2 45
The shareholders are committed, and in some moral sense, owed good
faith management, and so it may be rational, morally if not legally, for
them to expect something in return for their investment. 2 4 6
Perhaps, contra the suspicion of management that has existed in
corporation law since at least Berle and Means, 247 Snap's management
will do the right thing. There is no self-evident reason to believe that
it will not. 2 4 8 As Mauss explained, "[t]he unreciprocated gift still makes
the person who has accepted it inferior, particularly when it has been
accepted with no thought of returning it." 2 4 9 Snap's management
therefore may want to reciprocate the trust shown by their
shareholders. Simply put: don't we think that most founders of Silicon
Valley start-ups want to be respected as such, to enter the pantheon
with Hewlett, Packard, Jobs, Gates, and the other heroes? As Alan
Palmiter has argued, corporate management decisions are the product
of moral values, not economics or law. 25 0 In Professor Palmiter's view,
many of the supposed rational reasons for human actions, especially
in social or political groups, are more truly understood as justifications
or "after-the-fact rationalizations." 25 1 To the extent that the founders
are in a particular "tribal group," 25 2 they may act in the best interests
of their companies and their shareholders, regardless of whether such
behavior is "required" by legal doctrines like shareholder wealth
maximization, or by pressures from the market for corporate control.
Conversely, there are lines that cannot be crossed. Consider the
case of Uber Technologies Inc., the ride-hailing unicorn. 253 The founder
and former CEO Travis Kalanick held super-voting shares and what
appeared to be de facto control of the board, but was eventually forced
245. The English word "company" derives through French from the Latin word
"companio," which means "one who eats bread with you." Company, WEBSTER THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (unabr. 1976).
246. Of course, there have been plenty of scandals involving Silicon Valley start-ups. See
Erin Griffin, The Ugly Unethical Underside of Silicon Valley, FORTUNE (Dec. 28, 2016),
http://fortune.com/silicon-valley-startups-fraud-venture-capital/ [https://perma.cc/
M5QS-FW9C] (chronicling problems with Hampton Creek, Zenefits, Lending Club, Skully,
ScoreBig, Rothenberg Ventures, Faraday Future, Hyperloop One, Uber, and Theranos).
247. See supra Part IV.B.1.
248. Recall Larry Page's assurances in the Google Registration Statement. Google Form
S-1, supranote 6, at iii.
249. MAUSS, supra note 1, at 83.
250. See Alan R. Palmiter, CorporateGovernance as Moral Psychology, 74 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1119, 1122 (2017) (exploring the motivations of corporate governance in the context
of the scholarship of Lyman Johnson and David Millon).
251. Id. at 1120.
252. Id. at 1128.
253. About Us, UBER, https://www.uber.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/66LJ-XUXE]
(explaining what Uber is).
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to step down by five of the company's major investors. 25 4 In 2017, the
company abolished super-voting rights and returned to a one-vote-pershare structure, reportedly in preparation for its 2019 IPO. 2 55
It is not clear, however, if or how the obligation to run the company
for the benefit of its shareholders would be externally enforced onto
Snap's management. 25 6 SEC Rule 19c-4 was short-lived; all of the
major exchanges have relaxed or are relaxing their restrictions on
listing dual-class shares. 25 7 Even the indexes, which acted in response
to the Snap offering, are under increasing pressure to remove their
prohibitions. 25 8 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton stated that he does not
believe that indexes should choose which stocks to include based on
voting power: "[g]overnance by indexation doesn't sit really well with
me."

25 9

254. Mike Isaac, Uber Founder Travis Kalanick Resigns as C.E.O., N.YTIMES (June 21,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/technology/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick.html
[https://perma.cc/26HF-P27L] (detailing the fallout from Kalanick's "brash" approach as well
as allegations of sexual harassment in the Uber workplace).
255. See Winkler & Farrell, supra note 53. The October 2017 changes, which among
other things increased the board from 11 to 17 members who will all vote on an equal scale,
reportedly reduced Kalanick's control over the company, paved the way for a large
investment by Japanese SoftBank, and helped Uber prepare for a its IPO. David Goldman,
Uber Strips Power from
Ousted Kalanick, CNN TECH (Oct.
3, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/03/technology/business/uber-board-kalanick/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6LKX-VK9C]; Emily Bary, Uber IPO: 5 things you need to know about the
biggest
IPO
in
years,
MARKETWATCH
(May
13,
2019),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/uber-ipo-5-things-you-need-to-know-about-potentiallythe-biggest-ipo-in-years-2019-04-12 [https://perma.cc/BTU8-QPDM].
256. Cultural norms may be followed because they are norms, but people may also stray,
in which case society may enforce the norm. Indeed, a norm backed by a sanction is a
traditional understanding of what law essentially is, associated with HLA Hart, and some
corporate norms are enforced by courts. For pertinent example, currently Snap is defending
against a suit by its shareholders who are alleging that Snap's disclosure to investors in the
IPO was inadequate as a matter of securities law. In re Snap Inc. Sec. Litig., 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99704, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. June 07, 2018) (alleging that Snap did not reveal the extent
of competition from Instagram, a whistleblower law suit alleging inaccuracies in the
company's reporting of daily active users, and its use of "growth hacking"); see also Edvard
Pettersson, Snap Shareholders Can Pursue Claims that IPO Hid Crucial Information,
BLOOMBERG
(June 8,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-08/
snap-shareholders-can-pursue-claims-ipo-hid-crucial-information
[https://perma.cc/V2TUXQ7N]. The U.S. Department of Justice and the SEC have also launched investigations into
the company's statements ahead of the offering. Rachel Graf, Snap Facing Govt Probes after
Pre-IPO
Instagram
Claims,
LAw360
(Nov.
14,
2018),
https://www.1aw360.com/articles/1 101899/snap-facing-gov-t-probes-after-pre-ipoinstagram-claims [https://perma.cc/9K9J-BZRG].
257. See supra Part II.
258. See supra Part II.
259. FTSE Russell Voting Rights, supra note 100 (reporting on Chairman Clayton's
remarks at the March 2017 Council of Institutional Investors conference).
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Gift: Tradition::Individual: Social

Cultural anthropology tends to move from the particular to the
general; from data collected during fieldwork toward articulations of a
given culture, toward yet broader understandings of the human
condition. 2 6 0 So, Mauss begins with particular accounts of gift giving in
various parts of the world to suggest deep truths about gift giving writ
large, and even about how exchanges form social worlds. Trade
constitutes commercial cultures. 2 6 1 Methodologically, the effort is to
observe individuals in order to articulate and understand the
collective. 2 6 2 In this case, understanding the Snap offering may
illuminate, but may also only be understood in the context of,
contemporary equity markets.
The potlatch created three obligations: to give, to receive, and to
reciprocate. 2 63 For a gift to create such obligations, there must be a
social context in which the gift has such meanings. 2 6 4 People had to
understand what a potlach was, how it worked, and what the rules
were, in order to give and show their importance and to expect
reciprocation. 2 65 By the same token, a gift in a potlatch system had to
be visible. 2 66 The gift was given in the context of a public drama
because it was directly connected to honor and authority. 267
The parties did not merely receive meaning from their context; in
giving and receiving they perpetuated the tradition, in other wordsthey made the context. 2 68 The gift was constitutive: it wove the social
fabric among individuals, maybe even strangers. 2 6 9 Participation in the
260. See BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, THE ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC: AN
ACCOUNT OF NATIVE ENTERPRISE AND ADVENTURE IN THE ARCHIPELAGOES OF MELANESIAN
NEW GUINEA, 1-26 (1961 ed.) (explaining the subject, method, and scope of ethnography).

261. See David A. Westbrook, If Not a Commercial Republic? Political Economy in the
United States after Citizens United, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 35 (2011) (explaining that
various modes of social decision in U.S. society).
262. See DAVID A. WESTBROOK, NAVIGATORS OF THE CONTEMPORARY: WHY
ETHNOGRAPHY MATTERS (2008) 37-76 (analyzing ethnography for present situations).
Contemporary refunctioning of ethnography tends both to extend and to contrast itself from
the Malinowskian project. See MALINOWSKI, supra note 262; see also Michael M.J. Fischer,
Foreword: Renewable Ethnography, in FIELDWORK IS NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE: LEARNING
ANTHROPOLOGY'S METHOD IN A TIME OF TRANSITION vii (James D. Faubion & George E.
Marcus eds., 2009).
263. MAUSS supranote 1, at 50-53.
264. Id. at 52.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 47.
267. Id. at xviii. Arguably a gift exchange is not only more visible but also more readily
judged by society than a market exchange.
268. Id. at xi (explaining, in Mary Douglas's Foreword, the cycles and tradition).
269. See id. at 59. ("If one gives things and returns them, it is because one is giving and
returning 'respects'-we still say 'courtesies.' Yet it is also because by giving one is giving
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potlatch system therefore required both giving and receiving: "[t]o
refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount
to declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and commonality." 27 0
In sum, successfully giving, receiving, and creating an obligation to
reciprocate enabled people to come together.
The sense of being apart and together, or together and estranged,
is central to contemporary experience.2 7 1 In other circumstances, the
need to construct the social and to build community can be more
dramatic. For isolated peoples separated by miles of open ocean,
occasionally navigated in small boats, the stakes were high. "[T]here
is no middle way: one trusts completely, or one mistrusts completely;
one lays down one's arms and gives up magic, or one gives everything,
from fleeting acts of hospitality to one's daughter and one's goods." 27 2
In such societies, the peoples had no choice. "Two groups of men who
meet can only either draw apart, and, if they show mistrust towards
one another or issue a challenge, fight-or they can negotiate." 27 3 The
gift was the response by those societies to what Mauss called their
"unstable state between festival and war."2 7 4
Similarly, in Beowulf 75 and the Iliad,2 76 gifts strengthened the
bonds among warriors-or did not. In a heroic world, a meager gift was
important, not because the recipient was short-changed, but because
the recipient was insulted. 2 7 7 To generalize, giving and receiving
proper gifts presumes, creates, and stabilizes relationships, and so
society itself. In our modern markets, there is a "moral obligation"
imposed on managers who receive investment, but only insofar as we
presume a social world -the equity culture of Silicon Valley-in which
such moral statements are legible.
oneself, and if one gives oneself, it is because one 'owes' oneself-one's person and one's
goods-to others.").
270. Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted).
271. See, e.g., JOHN PAUL SARTRE, HuIS CLOS 47 (1947) (concluding, ''enfer, c'est les
Autres'). Coincidentally, managing such states of (dis)connection with the exchange of
images is what Snapchat does.
272. MAUSS, supranote 3, at 104.
273. Id. at 104-05.
274. Id. at 105.
275. BEOWULF,
BRIT.
LIBR.,
https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/beowulf
[https://perma.cc/7ZX9-MNKG]; BEOWULF (Lesslie Hall trans., Project Gutenberg 2005),
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/16328/16328-h/16328-h.htm
[https://perma.cc/2LS3NV3M].
276. HOMER, THE ILIAD OF HOMER (Alexander Pope trans., Project Gutenberg 2006),
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/6130/6130-h/6130-h.html#toc5
[https://perma.cc/UD9LHJXZ].
277. Id. at 163-64 (Agamemnon (the king of Mycenae) acknowledges that it was foolish
of him to insult Achilles and he offers Achilles lavish gifts, including the return of Briseis, if
Achilles agrees to rejoin the army).
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D. Collectivities
Gifts given by chiefs of peoples constitute the social obligation of
collectivities, not the atomistic individuals with which economic
thought 27 8 typically begins. The Tlingit and the Haida described their
system as tribal kinship groups showing respect to one another. 27 9
Clans exchanged total services, offering and receiving gifts to and from
each another. 2 80 However, the gifts or services were often given and
received in an environment of rivalry or even hostility.2 8 1 And, because
the clan operated through its chief, the gift exchange was at its heart
"a struggle between nobles to establish a hierarchy amongst
themselves from which their clan will benefit at a later date." 2 8 2 In his
seminal ethnography of the Trobriand people, 2 83 Bronislaw
Malinowski found that although their system of services rendered and
reciprocated (known as the kula) was extensive, "in the end, only the
chiefs, and even solely those drawn from the coastal tribes-and then
only a few-do in fact take part in it." 2 8 4

The situation of shareholders vis-A-vis managers in a contemporary
public corporation is, of course, different from the situation among
Trobriand chiefs. But what is not different is the participation and
therefore legitimation of social roles as opposed to personal, individual,
relations. If the founders and managers of Snap owe something to its
investors, they do so not because of any personal relationship with a
particular shareholder, but because that is how a shareholder should
be treated by the chiefs of a corporation. In both the Trobriand Islands
and Silicon Valley, the actions of chiefs are essentially representative.
E. Leadership
Finally, leadership entails the temporality of the collectivity; one
leads the group forward. 2 85 Just as we expect corporate managers to
278.

At least economic thought in the tradition running from Adam Smith through, inter

alia, Henry Manne, to contemporary corporate finance. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1982 ed.) (explaining the

potential mutual gains from exchanges between nations).
279. MAUSS, supra note 1, at 7.
280. Id. at 8.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Malinowski, supra note 262. Malinowski is commonly considered a founding father
of cultural anthropology.
284. MAUSS, supra note 1, at 34.
285. See, e.g., Deborah Blagg & Susan Young, What Makes a Good Leader, HARVARD
BUSINESS

SCHOOL: WORKING KNOWLEDGE

(Apr.

2, 2001),

https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/

what-makes-a-good-leader [https://perma.cc/Z3YF-HSY8] (quoting Harvard Business School
Professor Nitin Nohria explaining, "[e]nduring setbacks while maintaining the ability to
show others the way to go forward is a true test of leadership.")

906

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:861

talk about the growth of their companies and the benefits to come to
investors, in gift societies, the obligation to reciprocate entailed
interest. 2 8 6 If a subject received a blanket from his chief for some
service he rendered, he would give two blankets upon a marriage in
the chiefs family. Mauss estimated the rate of return to range from
3
0-100 % per year. 2 8 7 In the societies that Mauss studied, he found that
the obligation to reciprocate in the expected range was "imperative." 2 88
Failure to reciprocate the potlatch appropriately could result in loss of
rank and even slavery. 2 8 9
Less dramatically, a shareholder who is discontent with leadership
or with the way the company is growing, has the right to sell her
shares. In the context of crowdfunded equity, Professor Heminway
pointed out that, even without a vote, the right to sell is the "power to
discipline or signal poor firm management." 2 90 In the context of Snap
and other public companies in which the founders retain effective
control and substantial economic interest, the widespread sale of
shares would presumably drive down the price of shares, and therefore
lower the net worth of the founders. Thus one might say that, even in
the absence of a vote, the founders may be disciplined.
It is important to recall, however, that in such circumstances, the
founders would not be disciplined by a market for corporate control. 2 9 1
The founders would retain control of the company. 292 But the symbols
of participation in the company-shares-would be less desirable. 2 93
The founders, the leaders of the company, would have fewer people
who wanted to be "followers." 2 9 4 As demand for shares fell, presumably
so would the price. If so, the company's leaders would have less social
capital, 295 or more simply, less wealth. Snap and its kin thus have
286. MAUSS, supra note 1, at 53.
287. Id. Snap might have a hard time meeting such earnings expectations.
288. Id. at 54.
289. Id. (comparing the institutional punishment to the nexum in Roman law).
290. Heminway, supra note 231, at 189 (citing Manne and explaining the application to
crowdfunded equity, another locus of legal debate in the context of contemporary technology
ventures).
291. See supra Part II.
292. See supra Part II.
293. See Heminway, supranote 231, at 189.
294. "Followers" here uses the parlance of social media structures to explain the point.
295. See Lyda J. Hanifan, The Rural School Community Center, 67 ANNALS OF THE AM.
AcAD. OF POL. AND Soc. SCI. 130, 130 (1916) (defining "social capital" in the context of the
rural school community). Hanifan explained:
In the use of the phrase social capital I make no reference to the usual
acceptation of the term capital, except in a figurative sense. I do not refer to real
estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which
tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of a
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made literal the idea of "social capital." 2 9 6 The social standing of high
technology companies and their founding chiefs is monetized by the
market for powerless shares, tokens of association.
While a return to a traditional potlatch system does not seem
imminent, the importance of status in an exchange is becoming more
obvious in the digital age. Some scholars suggest that the return of the
gift in the current digital society is the result of a new, post-market
system that might be called a "crowd society:" a networked, open, and
mass-collaborative arrangement of Wikipedia, YouTube and fanfiction communities. 2 97 In a culture ripe with peer and user-generated
production,
"community
recognition
supersedes
economic
incentives." 2 98 Perhaps, in the equity markets, economic recognition
and social recognition have always been imbricated.
VII. CONCLUSION

Financial markets are often conceived of as spaces in which more
or less rationally self-interested individuals form legally enforceable
contractual agreements, or rely on market mechanisms, to structure
relationships that generate profitable outcomes with a reasonable
degree of certainty. That just does not seem to be what is happening
with Snap. Or, more precisely, it is what is happening with Snap, but
the market in question-for equity in high technology companies-is
a more deeply acculturated space than the traditional conception
allows. In addition, the "individuals" who inhabit that space must be
understood in terms of their context, not as individuals strictly
speaking.
If the foregoing is true enough, then doctrinal problems arise.
Henry Sumner Maine defined modernity (in law especially) as the
movement from status to contract. 2 99 Similarly, Mauss was careful to
call societies with gift economies "archaic," even if his intentions

people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse
among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit ....

Id.
296. For a discussion on the forms of capital, see Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital,
in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241-58 (J.
Richardson ed., 1986).

297.

See generally Giancarlo F. Frosio, User Patronage: The Return of the Gift in the

"Crowd Society," MICH. ST. L. REV. 1983 (2015) (exploring the tension between the gift
economy and the market economy in the history of creativity).
298. Id.
299. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY
OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 170 (John Murray ed., 16th ed. 1897).
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seemed a bit more subversive.3 00 We "moderns," on the other hand,
tend to see ourselves as rational and equal, with our relations formed
by acts of choice.3 01 Nowhere is this more pronounced than in economic
life, in markets.3 0 2 We reflexively contrast this self-understanding with
"traditional" societies, which are about association, hierarchical
status, and tribes. Nevertheless, in some ways, what is arguably our
premier market is all about status and socially defined obligations.3 03
Historically, we may argue that although the conventional
narrative epitomized by Maine holds that a clan society was replaced
by a modern society of property and free exchange, 30 4 offerings such as
the Snap IPO suggest that our current digital, crowd-based
environment may be more hierarchical. With a "market" that not only
accepts but welcomes reciprocal, status-establishing exchanges, we
may be moving beyond liberal political economy.
Philosophically, our reading of Mauss suggests that perhaps our
understanding of the modern was always overdone; that the
individualistic liberal imagination at the heart of utilitarian economic
thought (and most finance) was misbegotten from the beginning. The
social always matters, especially to obligation, property, law, and so
forth. To believe that at some point, perhaps in early twentieth century
Paris, or for that matter early twenty-first century Silicon Valley,
individuals walked the earth, naked and alone, freely contracting, is
simply to refuse to acknowledge the reality of the social.
The Snap IPO suggests that rethinking is in order. Perhaps we
never understood ourselves. Or perhaps we did, once, and are
becoming something else.

300. MAUSS, supra note 3, at x (including the suggestion, in Mary Douglas' Foreword,
that the book was part of an "organized onslaught on contemporary political theory," namely
utilitarianism).
301.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para 1 Stat. 1 (U.S. 1776) (asserting "WE

hold these truths to be self-evident, that all [persons] are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness").
302. See MAINE, supra note 301, at 170; see also SMITH, supra note 280 (expressing the
centrality of economics in human life).
303. One could go further and say radical inequality and noblesse oblige as well. See
David A. Westbrook, The Culture of Financial Institutions; the Institution of Political
Economy, in REGULATING CULTURE: INTEGRITY, RISK AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CAPITAL

MARKETS 3-20 (2013) (arguing that "medieval" forms of social organization reappear in
'modern" financial markets); David A. Westbrook, Neofeudalism, Paraethnographyand the
Custodial Regulation of FinancialInstitutions, 2 JASSA: THE FISIA J. OF APPLIED FIN., 5761 (2013) (arguing that understanding status to entail social obligation provides
opportunities for better prudential regulation of financial institutions).
304.

CHRIS GREGORY, GIFTS AND COMMODITIES 37 (1982) (contrasting Mauss's clan

communities of gift exchange with the modern class society of private property and
commodity).

